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TRAINING FOR PEACE:

The U.S. Army's Post-Cold War Strategy

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. national military strategy had to go through dramatic changes. The U.S. military spent the past two decades developing and refining a joint, combined arms approach to war fighting designed to defeat Cold War opponents. Because of this, units' mission essential task lists did not include: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian operations. Now, with a significantly changed world situation, is it reasonable to expect—either at present or in the near term—the same degree of military excellence when participating the new types of missions associated with post-Cold War realities? This paper examines the question in detail by evaluating the relevance of the U.S. Army's doctrine and training strategies for operations other than war through an analysis of the institutional changes resulting from lessons learned starting with Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989).

Recognizing, however, that training for peace operations is ultimately only as useful as the strategy and doctrine which undergird it, some attention is devoted to policy debates over the use of force, role of contemporary peace operations in U.S. foreign and national security policy, and the doctrinal underpinnings of Army training for operations other than war. The Clinton administration policy on multilateral peace operations, PDD-25, provides the strategic basis to re-focus the doctrine supporting such missions.

A case is made that because operations other than war are significantly different from war itself, an expanded training strategy is necessary to enhance mission effectiveness. Specifically, stability operations: have different operating principles, are lacking clear strategic direction, are expanded in scope, rely on limited intelligence, are characterized by political and cultural diversity, involve the coordination of multiple players, are media intensive, have only limited rule of law, employ constrictive rules of engagement, are likely to occur in austere environments, are dominated by small and independent unit operations, demand a visible presence, are set in primarily built-up or urban areas, require Psychological and Civil Affairs integration, and mandate extensive negotiations. Commanders who have participated in recent deployments unequivocally argue that additional skills are required for today's contemporary missions. To succeed, the Army must train commanders and staffs to deal with these differences.

Just as U.S. policy on the employment of military force has evolved from the Weinberger doctrine to the operational principles embodied in PDD-25, the Army's training strategy has adjusted course as well. The Army's professional military education system has expanded its curriculum to teach the operational principles and tactics associated with the sixteen operations other than war missions. Each branch Service School has incorporated staff, situational, and field training exercises to reinforce the doctrinal principles and tactics associated with their manuals. The courses of instruction at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College have expanded as well. After evaluating how the Army has adjusted its training strategy to accommodate the post-Cold War realities, it is evident that the U.S. Army has been able to maintain its warfighting edge while simultaneously expanding its playbook to accommodate the myriad tasks associated with contemporary peace operations.

In addition, the Army has intensified training in urban environments and routinely incorporates rules of engagement in exercise play. Its Combat Training Centers have expanded their scenarios to incorporate peace operation missions testing a unit's ability to apply appropriate small unit tactics whose success often hinges on effectively integrating psychological operations and civil affairs personnel into the fold. Predeployment training covers detailed cultural orientations, incorporates simulations involving interface with governmental and non-governmental organizations and belligerent parties to enhance negotiating skills. Moreover, the Army has developed specific strategies to more effectively deal with the media and trains its leaders accordingly. Contemporary military thought has been expanded to consider the tasks required after the conflict or crisis stage of an intervention. Considerable attention has been placed on constabulary reconstitution and rule of law issues which are necessary for the long-term security of the local populations. Efforts to revise doctrine, professional military education, and unit training have made the U.S. Army the world's premiere peacekeeper.

Just as the number of peace operations has effectively doubled from 13 during the Cold War to 26 today, there remain plausible operations on the horizon. Indeed, a conflict-prone international environment underscores the possibility of future, perhaps more frequent engagements. Because of this, the Army must continue to refine its training strategy to accommodate such future challenges. Based upon this research, there are three particular areas that need renewed emphasis. First, it is clear that small units dominate peace operation missions, yet only a two hour block of instruction on operations other than war is included in the curriculum of most Non-commissioned Officer Academy courses. More needs to be done here. Second, there is an acute need to improve the negotiating skills of leaders throughout the Army. To date, this requirement has not received adequate attention within the professional military education system. Indeed, the only formalized course on this subject is an elective at the Army War College. Finally, it is arguable that the Army does enough combined arms training in urban environments. Recent interventions demonstrate a combined arms approach is necessary for mission success. However, based on personal observations and numerous interviews, most divisions limit this training to infantry units.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, the Army has generally kept pace with the rigorous and increasing demands on Army forces brought about by peace operations. It has not been without costs, however. The increased frequency of deployments coupled with the additive nature of peace operations training has increased the operational tempo of units to unparalleled levels. This requires an answer to a difficult and problematic question: With increased mission requirements and a continued decline in real defense expenditures, is the Army capable of fielding forces for the two 'nearly simultaneous' combat missions envisioned in contemporary strategic planning while maintaining a quality of life necessary to maintain an all volunteer force? Concerns are being expressed by many that the armed forces may be heading down the 'hollow' path of the 1970s.

Moreover, although training for peace operations is for the most part solid, such training would not be useful if the U.S. government decided that it did not wish to rely upon such missions as a key element of its national security policy. While the Clinton administration has embraced peace operation engagements, Congress resists. Greater

cooperation between these two branches of government on this issue would substantially improve military planning and better shape the long-term training needs. All things considered, it is perhaps axiomatic that training is only as useful as the strategy it serves. As the Vietnam and Somalia interventions indicate, tactical success is possible even with strategic failure. Given the shrinking resources dedicated to active U.S. post-Cold War international engagement, this can be ill-afforded.

“Training for Peace: The U.S. Army’s Post-Cold War Strategy”

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union necessitated a reexamination of the U.S. national military strategy. The euphoric cries of a more peaceful and prosperous “new world order” were short-lived. Today, we face the sobering realities of armed conflict and humanitarian crises in many regions of the world resulting from opposing ethnic, religious, racial, and political ideologies, as well as natural disasters and failing states.

The U.S. military had spent the past two decades developing and refining a joint, combined arms approach to war fighting designed to defeat Cold War opponents. Preparations for combat on these battlefields inspired an integrated military strategy which placed a premium on joint operations. Indeed, the overwhelming victory achieved during Desert Storm (1991) was the culmination of the previous two decades of military effort. The structure, doctrine, equipment, and training for U.S. armed forces withstood the tests of war. Now, with a significantly changed world situation, is it reasonable to expect the same degree of military excellence when participating in the new types of missions associated with military operations other than war? This paper examines the question in detail by tracing the evolution of U.S. national strategic policy and how the military strategy has responded. The factors that differentiate today's contemporary operations from warfighting are examined as well as the relevance of the U.S. Army's doctrine and training strategies for these types of operations through an analysis of the institutional changes resulting from lessons learned starting with Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989) and concludes with a resounding—you bet!

DEFINITIONS

Although there has been much debate within military circles on how to differentiate and categorize military operations other than war, common definitions emerged and have been incorporated into the defense establishment's lexicon.¹ Recent literature created confusion when peace operations were being discussed because terms were being used interchangeably. Since many contemporary military operations fall into this mission category and are the subjects of this manuscript, It is necessary to establish a common frame of reference by reviewing applicable definitions as described in the Joint Warfighting Center's *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* and in FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*:²

Peace Operations: Umbrella term which encompasses peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations, and other military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

Peacekeeping: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.

Peace Enforcement: Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

Support to diplomacy: Encompassing term whose components include peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy.

¹Joint Pub. 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense [hereafter, DOD], 1995), has listed sixteen types of missions: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counternarcotics Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Support to Civil Authorities, Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Protection of Shipping, Recovery Operations, Show of Force Operations, Strikes and Raids, Support to Insurgency, and Peace Operations.

²See Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Virginia: Fort Monroe, February 1995), pp. GL-5-8; and U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations* (December 1994), pp. 2-12. For simplicity's sake, in this paper the terms military operations other than war (MOOTW), contingency operations, and stability operations are used interchangeably.

Peacemaking: Process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict.

Peace Building: Post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into a conflict.

Preventive Diplomacy: Actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence; e.g., show of force or increasing levels of readiness.

EVOLUTION OF POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC POLICY

The policy debate on criteria for the use of military force came into focus just over one year after 239 U.S. marines died in an ill-defined peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (1983). Then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger established clearly-defined criteria for the use of force abroad. Recalling public antipathy toward the military resulting from the Vietnam debacle and Lebanon disaster, Weinberger emphasized the need to ensure widespread popular support for U.S. forces for the duration of a conflict:

- Forces should not be committed unless the action is vital to the U.S. national interest or that of allies;
- Forces should be committed wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning, or they should not be committed at all;
- If forces are committed, it should be with clearly defined political and military objectives and with a precise sense of how the forces deployed can achieve the objectives;
- The relationship between objectives and forces must be continually reassessed and adjusted, if necessary;
- Before committing forces abroad there must be some reasonable assurance of public and congressional support; and
- The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should only be as a last resort.³

³See Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: 1991), pp. 445-454.

Although Weinberger was discussing the commitment of U.S. troops to combat, the criteria are also applicable to operations short of war. Taking the lead to expand upon and revise his criteria, then-Secretary of State George Shultz subsequently argued that the need sometimes exists to employ armed force for objectives short of 'vital' national interest, particularly those which reside in the moral dimension. Use of force, for Shultz, was justified when:

- It helps liberate a people or support the yearning for freedom;
- Its aim is to bring peace or to support peaceful processes;
- It prevents others from abusing their power through aggression or oppression; and
- It is applied with the greatest effort to avoid unnecessary casualties and with a conscience troubled by the pain unavoidably inflicted.⁴

In the post-Cold War era, President Bush extended this debate, arguing in an address at West Point that: "real leadership requires a willingness to use military force," but at times such "force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital."⁵ Echoing this, senior Clinton administration officials have repeatedly asserted that the "selective but substantial" use of force might be necessary to support coercive diplomacy even when non-vital national interests were at stake.⁶

While such debates revolve around the use of force in general, the first three years of the Clinton administration have also been marked by nearly continual debates

⁴See George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: 1993), pp. 645-651. For a discussion of the Weinberger-Shultz debates and subsequent modifications, see Stephen Daggett and Nina Serafino, *The Use of Force: Key Contemporary Documents*, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report 94-805F (Washington, D.C.: CRS, October 17, 1994).

⁵White House, "Remarks by President Bush to Cadets at West Point Military Academy," January 5, 1993.

⁶See John McLaughlin, "One on One With Guest, Secretary of Defense William Perry," the McLaughlin Group, August 13, 1994; Anthony Lake, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World," address delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., March 6, 1996.

over the nature, relevance, and desirability of the use of force for peace operations. In its first *National Security Strategy* document, released in July 1994, the administration argued that "multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. From traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement, multilateral peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly."⁷

In the second and third versions of this document, released in February 1995 and 1996, the administration differentiated between *vital*, *important*, and *humanitarian* interests.⁸ For the first set of interests, "we will do whatever it takes to defend these interests." For the second category, "military forces should be used only if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake, and other means have been tried and have failed to achieve our objectives." For matters of humanitarian interest, the military "is generally not the best tool,...but under certain conditions the use of our armed forces may be appropriate," such as when a humanitarian catastrophe is clearly beyond the capacity of the civilian relief agencies to respond; when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to 'jump-start' the longer-term response to the disaster; when the response requires resources unique to the military; and when the risk to American troops is minimal.

While the Clinton administration was drafting its first national security document, the deleterious U.S. experience in Somalia served to reduce administration interest in multilateral peace operations in the wake of bitter congressional and public criticism. By February 1994, while still supporting U.S. involvement in such multilateral operations,

⁷White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1994), p. 13. This document was later echoed by a supportive national military strategy. See DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, February 1995).

⁸White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1995, pp. 12-13, 16; February 1996, pp. 18-19.

National Security Adviser Anthony Lake declared that "peacekeeping is not at the center of our foreign or defense policy."⁹ This position became official U.S. policy in the finalized text of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25, which stated that peace operations could contribute to "prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts," and act as a force multiplier for United States policy in general. PDD-25 laid out factors to be considered before deciding whether to vote in support of a U.N. or regionally-sponsored peace operation. These factors serve as the basis for U.S. involvement in peace operations and military intervention today:¹⁰

- Whether U.N. involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis;
- Whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security based upon:
 - International aggression; or
 - Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; or
 - Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence;
- If there are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement;
- For traditional peacekeeping (Chapter VI) operations, a cease-fire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed;
- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant;

⁹Anthony Lake, "The Limits of Peacekeeping," *The New York Times*, p. 17, February 6, 1994. Still, General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior officials have indicated their support for involvement in operations other than war, firmly rejecting the so-called "Somalia syndrome" notion that the Pentagon should "only do the big ones." See John Shalikashvili, "Employing Forces Short of War," *Defense* 95 (3), p. 3; Thomas E. Ricks, "Colin Powell's Doctrine on Use of Military Force is Now Being Questioned by Senior U.S. Officers," *The Wall Street Journal*, p. A1, August 30, 1995; Bruce W. Nelan, "What Price Glory?" *Time*, pp. 50-51, November 27, 1995.

¹⁰The text of PDD-25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," is reprinted in Lowenthal, *Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy*, CRS Report for Congress, May 1994, pp. 26-43. See also Nina Serafino, *Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, CRS Issue Brief 94040 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, September 13, 1995), pp. 2-3; Mark M. Lowenthal, *Peacekeeping and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implementing PDD-25*, CRS Issue Brief 94043 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, September 23, 1994), pp. 1-9.

- Whether the means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission;
- Whether the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable; and
- Whether the operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

In addition to asking the hard question of whether or not a proposed operation is in the U.S. national interest, PDD-25 also asks whether the operation could succeed without U.S. support, and calls for consideration of other viable alternatives—including the option of doing nothing. Of particular importance in this document is the necessity to both have sufficient resources and planning to successfully achieve the operation under consideration, and also to have popular and congressional support. For some informed observers, there is a clear recognition that neither the United Nations, nor America's European allies, nor any other country or organization in the world can substitute for U.S. leadership and involvement in peace operations, due to resource demands, political will, or logistical and infrastructure capabilities.¹¹

DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE

Just as U.S. strategic policy has evolved, U.S. military doctrine has been transformed in accordance with the post-Cold War international security environment. Former Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan (USA, ret.), articulated the role of doctrine best in FM 100-1, *The Army*, by stating, "our doctrine establishes a common language for professional soldiers, communicates institutional knowledge, and establishes a shared understanding of organizational purpose..., establishes war fighting principles for the employment of the Army which are relevant to the

¹¹Stanley R. Sloan, *Global Burdensharing in the Post-Cold War World*, CRS Report for Congress 93-982S (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 8, 1993).

contemporary environment..., [and] represents the continuing progression of the Army's intellectual adaptation to the changed strategic environment."¹²

Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Army's capstone doctrine, FM 100-5, *Operations*, was based upon offensive-oriented "Air-land battle" principles which were primarily focused on a potential conflict with the Warsaw Pact. More attention to activities short of war was clearly needed in the context of a dramatically altered world situation predicated on a changing threat environment. Accordingly, FM 100-5 was updated in 1993, and emphasized the relevance of operations other than war in a free-standing chapter. In particular, the chapter elaborates upon the unique operational principles and sixteen mission categories of operations other than war. Historical examples provided give the reader clear insight into the nature of these types of operations. By incorporating these changes and retaining the clear tactics and operational concepts covering the full range of military operations, the Army has been able to link military operations to national objectives. The significance of this manual can not be over-emphasized, since it serves as the basis from which all supporting doctrinal manuals, resulting tactics and training strategies exist.

Quick to expand upon its capstone doctrine, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, was published in December 1994 capturing many of the lessons learned from recent operations like Operations Provide Comfort in Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia. Directly supporting FM 100-5, this doctrinal manual appropriately depicts the strategic context, organizational principles, and operational imperatives that are unique to peace operations. Considerable attention is placed on the planning considerations and coordination challenges resulting from the other U.S. and international government agencies, multi-national military forces, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) typically operating within the area of operation. This has been followed by similar

¹²General Gordon R. Sullivan, "Foreword," in U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-1, *The Army* (June 1994).

publications: for instance, FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*, was distributed in July 1993, and FM 100-23-1, *Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, in 1995. As will be demonstrated in subsequent sections, Branch and Integrating Centers such as the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas have made significant strides in updating the relevant tactical literature as well. These evolving doctrinal principles and concepts, reinforced by hard lessons learned, have established an appropriate vector to enhance the military's ability to effectively execute contemporary operations.

DEFINING THE CHALLENGE

The very nature of recent contingency operations has tested the mettle of the participating commanders and units. As discussed in the introductory section, the Army had been focused on the high intensity battlefields of Europe, Korea, or the Middle East. Conventional military operations were within the comfort zone of the military hierarchy, geared more toward fighting and winning wars than waging a soft peace. Because of this, units' mission essential task lists did not include the conduct of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian operations. As a result, commanders participating in initial post-Cold War operations such as Provide Comfort in war-torn Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia were faced with missions they had not trained for. Instead, they relied on their own best judgment to guide, measure, and evaluate their actions. Although tactical success was consistently achieved, successive after-action reports and recent literature highlight areas where improvement was needed. As will be demonstrated in subsequent sections of this paper, the Army has responded to these challenges by updating the majority of its doctrinal literature and adjusting the curriculum at most of its professional military education institutions.

There are many within the military establishment who argue that there is no need to establish a separate training strategy for military operations other than war. Instead, they assert that warfighting tactics and procedures are easily modified for these missions. Conversely, others are concerned that explicit training for such operations dulls the warfighter ethic of professional soldiers to the detriment of fighting effectiveness. This section of the paper details the factors which differentiate contingency from conventional operations, based upon a review of the literature, after-action reports for seven recent operations,¹³ and interviews with participants. They include: operating principles, lack of strategic direction, expanded scope, limited intelligence, political and cultural diversity, multiple players, media intensity, the lack of or limited rule of law, constrictive rules of engagement, likely occurrence in austere environments, domination by small and independent unit operations, the demand for a visible presence, set in primarily built-up or urban areas, requiring Psychological and Civil Affairs integration, and mandating extensive negotiations. Examples are also provided of unit ineffectiveness which resulted from the inappropriate application of operational principles or failure to adequately understand the environmental characteristics as well as success stories resulting from innovative tactics developed in recent operations. This discussion will help illustrate why the Army has had to adjust its training strategy to deal more effectively with the realities of a post-Cold War world.

Operational Principles

The first, and probably most important consideration is that there are significant differences in warfighting principles and those inherent in operations other than war. The elements of objective and security are common to both categories. Offense, mass,

¹³The operations studied include: Restore Hope (Somalia), 1993-94; Uphold Democracy (Haiti), 1994-95; Able Sentry (Macedonia), 1993-95; Support Hope (Rwanda), 1994; Provide Comfort (northern Iraq), 1991-95; Joint Endeavor (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 1995-96; and Hurricane Andrew Disaster Relief (1993).

unity of command, economy of force, maneuver, surprise, and simplicity remain the dominant principles for contingency operations that involve direct combat. As military operations become less 'war-like,' however, various principles emerge from the doctrinal literature which dominate military actions: unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The application of these principles may help determine mission success or failure as will be described below.

Recent political decisions and the actions of multilateral force participants in recent operations indicate that unity of command may be impractical for stability operations. Indeed, PDD-25 clearly "underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces" to United Nations or other multinational commands.¹⁴ The Italian failure to comply with command direction and mission tasking in Somalia¹⁵ and a similar breach of command direction by a Nordic battalion in Bosnia which refused to relieve Canadian forces in the eastern enclave of Srebrenica serve as illustrative examples as well.¹⁶ Dual chains of command, as established in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the implementation force (IFOR) and the civilian High Representative responsible for coordinating and implementing the non-military aspects, are not new. These factors, coupled with the requirement to interface and support non-governmental organizations which operate under independent charters and report to Boards of Directors make *unity of effort* the guiding principle for operations other than war.

Restraint has been added because, unlike conventional operations which reward the use of overwhelming force, its disproportionate use in peace operations can result in unforeseen circumstances. In a recent article, Adam Roberts describes four dilemmas

¹⁴Mark M. Lowenthal, *Peacekeeping and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implementing PDD-25*, CRS Report for Congress, September 23, 1994, pp. 1, 4-5.

¹⁵John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), pp. 40-43, 88, 144.

¹⁶Tom Post with Joel Brand, "Blues for the Blue Helmets," *Newsweek*, February 7, 1994, pp. 22-23.

which must be considered before applying force in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. First, although the use of force may establish credibility, it also makes peacekeepers more vulnerable to attack by belligerent parties. Second, collateral civilian damage and deaths create resentment and forces risk being accused of brutal acts which can weaken the will of countries providing the military forces. Third, the use of force may compromise the perception of impartiality. And finally, there is a reluctance to leave use of force decisions to others when lives of their peacekeepers and reputations are at stake.¹⁷

Perseverance has been added because of the long term nature of peace operations—especially the peace-building phase of an intervention. When viewing conflict as a progression of time, some analysts estimate that it may take beyond twenty years to provide the necessary social change required for sustained conflict avoidance.¹⁸ The U.S. military's continued engagement in Panama, the Sinai, Kuwait, and Macedonia attest to this. Indeed, the Dayton Accords acknowledge this principle by maintaining High Commissioner oversight responsibility for the Joint Commissions on Human Rights, Refugees, and National Monuments for five years. The distinctive nature of this protracted conflict mandates a long-term presence of the NGO community as well (discussed below).

Finally there is a need to understand *legitimacy* as a condition which "sustains the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions."¹⁹ Typically, the U.S. military's authority to carry out decisions has been legitimized by U.N. mandate. Conversely, the inadvertent dealings with criminal elements early on in the Somalia operation helped contribute to

¹⁷Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36:3, Autumn 1994, pp. 93-120.

¹⁸John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Tokyo: United Nations University, November 1994), p. 36.

¹⁹FM 100-5, *Operations*, Department of the Army, June 1993, section 13-4.

the legitimization of some inappropriate—or illegitimate—actors. The same will hold true in Bosnia and Herzegovina when commanders will be exposed to possible inadvertent interaction with indicted war criminals.²⁰ Accordingly, Army doctrine clearly cautions personnel to use extreme caution when dealing with individuals and organizations where no government exists.

Lack Of Strategic Direction

Almost every operation the U.S. military has participated in since Just Cause has been lacking in strategic direction, or the guidance was late in coming. Desert Shield and Desert Storm were notable exceptions. Mission requirements and desired political objectives have been tough to define, often placing commanders in difficult situations. In order to stay within desired mission boundaries, the Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division, Major General S.L. Arnold, prepared a mission statement including a description of the commander's intent, success criteria, and desired end-state, and then sent it up the chain of command for approval during both the Florida disaster relief mission and Somalia operation. Reacting to inexact mission guidance, in which he felt he was likely to assume a mission that was outside the desired framework of the senior leadership, General Arnold essentially established the parameters of the operation.²¹

In Rwanda, LTG Schroeder was faced with a similar challenge. He would receive incremental guidance from the National Command Authority after the mission statement had already been issued by the commander-in-chief of U.S. European forces and the mission analysis had been performed by the U.S. European Command staff. In a draft after-action report, ten separate objectives were cited ex post facto.²²

²⁰Indicted war criminal-at-large Ivica Rajik, a former Croatian militia officer, stated recently that he was not afraid of arrest by NATO soldiers: "What can NATO do to me? I run this town." See John Pomfret, "Wanted Man Tests NATO's Mission," *The Washington Post*, p. A37, December 14, 1995.

²¹Author's interview with Maj. Gen. S. L. Arnold, Washington, D.C., January 9, 1996.

²²They included: assisting in the deployment of the full contingent of U.N. forces, taking steps to establish conditions that will permit the refugees to return home to Rwanda, establish and manage an

The complex nature of peace operations makes it much more difficult to develop strategic objectives that are easily translatable into supporting operational and tactical mission statements. The simplicity and clarity of the directive from the Combined Chiefs to General Eisenhower before the Normandy invasion in WW II serves to illustrate the point that strategic direction provided in support of wartime missions is easier to accommodate. The guidance was:

Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations.²³

Commanders cannot anticipate guidance that is as similarly focused or as unrestrained for operations other than war.

Expanded Scope

In recent operations, the role of the military has been significantly expanded, at times catching the commanders off guard. According to Richard Shultz, the United States and United Nations have repeatedly failed to develop a strategy that effectively incorporates the military's role in expanded phases of missions such as post-conflict/crisis reconstruction or nation-building efforts. This shortfall was well documented in the aftermath of Operation Just Cause in Panama. As Richard Shultz explains, "Looking back on the experience in Panama, it is evident that the U.S. government was programmatically and structurally ill equipped for the situation that followed the fighting."²⁴ He concludes that the planning challenge was hampered by six obstacles:

airfield hub in Uganda, and other similar objectives. See Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, KS), draft after action report on Operation Support Hope, pp. 17-18 (mimeo).

²³Edward J. Filiberti, "National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format?" *Parameters* 25:3 (Autumn 1995), p. 42.

²⁴Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation Building in Panama Following Just Cause*, Air University Press, August 1993, pp. 17-24.

- Failure to provide clear post-conflict restoration objectives;
- Exclusion of other civilian agencies in the planning process;
- Bifurcation of the planning process into warfighting and post-conflict restoration;
- Lack of experienced personnel in restoration planning;
- Failure to understand the impact of twenty years of praetorian rule; and
- Failure to effectively determine who was in charge.

According to Shultz, "There was no integrated strategy for supporting nation building and democratization in Panama following Just Cause."²⁵ This failure exemplifies a tactical success that could have resulted in a strategic failure because of the ineffectual nation-building phase of the campaign plan and the military's inability to recognize that other governmental organizations may not mobilize as quickly.

The expanding scope of Operation Restore Hope from a U.S.-led humanitarian intervention into a conflict resolution and nation-building mission further illustrates the point. Operations tend to encompass peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace-building components which may occur simultaneously. The broad scope of Restore Hope in Somalia was replicated during Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti. During the Haiti operation, the 10th Mountain Division's focus changed from peace enforcement to nation-building as the situation stabilized. Clearly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar mission expansion is likely to occur as the situation matures and the belligerent parties are separated.

Recent operations have increasingly strained division and ad hoc headquarters due to the relatively small commitment of forces necessary to accomplish the mission. The 10th Mountain Division was the first division to serve as an Army Forces headquarters in recent times, significantly expanding the operational scope for which

²⁵Ibid, pp. 63-64.

this headquarters was designed. They performed this function during the Hurricane Andrew Disaster Relief operation, then again during Operation Restore Hope. The division's mission scope was expanded further when they served as a Joint Task Force headquarters during the Uphold Democracy operation in Haiti. Although the division demonstrated they could perform these expanded roles, the staff officers had limited experience utilizing the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) which contributed to the deployment problems plaguing the U.S. Transportation Command in recent operations. During the Rwanda operation, it is arguable that well over 50 percent of the problems identified in the after-action report were directly attributable to the ad hoc nature of the staff and lack of familiarity with JOPES.²⁶ While JOPES is supposed to facilitate logistical coordination in complex military operations, it is evident that it functions only as well as the weakest link in the chain—in this case, the training proficiency of the staff.

Ultimately, the expanded scope of military operations will cause a unit's mission essential tasks to change as it transitions from one phase of the operation to another and as new missions are assigned to traditional tactical and operational headquarters. For example, a change in focus may cause elements of an infantry battalion's tasks to change from conducting air assault, area security, and search and cordon operations to conducting humanitarian, election, and refugee relocation assistance operations. Moreover, divisions must also be prepared to serve as the headquarters for Army Forces or a Joint Task Force.

²⁶Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, KS), draft after action report on Operation Support Hope (mimeo, n.d.). Although there were well over 200 observations identified in the draft report, many could be attributed to establishing a staff ad hoc. For example, some of the problems faced included a lack of understanding of the functions of the joint staff, a lack of staff cohesion, unclear command and control relationships, and a lack of established planning standard operating procedures.

Limited Intelligence

Recent military interventions have been characteristically void of useful intelligence data and have been in locations where a human intelligence infrastructure had not been well established. This was most evident during Operations Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), Restore Hope (Somalia), and Support Hope (Rwanda). To a lesser extent, this holds true for the interventions in Haiti, Panama, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This shortcoming is well articulated by Richard Best, who argues that "Creating a capability to provide intelligence support to future peacekeeping missions is a significant challenge. Potential opponents of peacekeeping missions may be relatively small, clandestine groups that are difficult to monitor with systems designed for the surveillance of highly sophisticated military establishments."²⁷ This void has led to ineffective actions by early deploying units, such as dealing with inappropriate actors.

Recognizing this shortfall, the 10th Mountain Division developed a detailed patrol checklist to determine the nature and extent of anticipated clan interference with U.S. operations, as well as the condition and attitudes of the general population while in Somalia. The checklist proved so useful that similar checklists were developed for airfield security, roadblocks, and convoy operations. The efficient use of these checklists greatly enhanced the overall intelligence picture and minimized the unit train-up required.²⁸

Realizing that human intelligence was the most productive source of information in Somalia, techniques to expand its use were developed. For instance, the threat from land mines hampered operations along major supply routes and selected relief sites. Since satellite imagery was of limited utility in detecting mined areas, Somali translators would accompany mine sweeping teams who would make contact with local village

²⁷Richard A. Best, Jr., *Peacekeeping: Intelligence Requirements*, CRS Report for Congress 94-394F, May 6, 1994, p. 17.

²⁸Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, KS), *Operation Restore Hope, 3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993: Lessons Learned Report*, November 15, 1993, section III.

leaders to help locate known mined sites. Due to the extent of mining in Bosnia and Herzegovina—some estimate that as many as three million mines have been placed—human intelligence source will need to be cultivated, cooperation with coalition forces maintained, and key information exchanged between the various intelligence agencies. Indeed, the United States has authorized certain foreign military officers to fly on highly classified U.S. signals intelligence aircraft in Bosnia.²⁹

Political and Cultural Diversity

With the exception of the U.S. intervention in Panama and recent domestic disaster relief operations, deployments occurred where the majority of the local and foreign populations had not been exposed to each other's political or cultural orientations. Recognition of and respect for these differences has been identified as a training requirement before each deployment. Even though each U.S. predeployment training program covered cultural and political orientations, the military's insensitivity to cultural differences has been identified as a factor contributing to tensions between the Somalis and U.N. forces—significantly reducing the military's effectiveness.³⁰ As Mohammed Sahnoun, a former U.N. envoy to Somalia, has indicated, "In Somali culture, the worst thing you can do is humiliate them, to do something to them you are not doing to another clan....It's the kind of psychology the U.N. doesn't understand."³¹ It is arguable that the mandate for the U.N. phase of the mission in Somalia, although intended to be

²⁹R. Jeffrey Smith, "High Tech Cooperation in Bosnia", *The Washington Post*, January 19, 1996, p. A30. According to the author, "At the heart of intelligence effort in Bosnia is a brigade sized unit of the Army's V Corps consisting of more than 1,000 intelligence officers, analysts, signal officers, and counterintelligence specialist. Supplementing this group are dozens of small teams composed of CIA, NSA, and Defense Intelligence Agency officers deployed in the field."

³⁰Center for Naval Analysis, 1995 Annual Conference (Washington, D.C.), Breakout Session I, "The Military in Somalia—the Wrong Tool for the Right Job?" October 26, 1995, p. 5.

³¹Louise Lief and Bruce B. Auster, "The Unmaking of Foreign Policy," *U.S. News and World Report*, October 18, 1993, p. 35.

impartial, ran counter to the long-term political objectives of local leaders such as General Aideed—prompting his hostile military actions.

The outgoing U.N. commander of Bosnia's northeastern sector, Brigadier General Haukland of Norway, has advised IFOR leaders that U.S. troops should balance peace enforcement aspects of the mission "with acts of goodwill and respect for Bosnian ways and feelings." While "providing security is the primary task...you also have to show the local population that you care for them. It's very important to have good relations with the people....They are proud people who want to be masters in their own house."³²

Multiple Players

Although the U.S. government reserves the right to act unilaterally when protecting its foreign policy interests—as in Operation Just Cause—each subsequent military intervention has been multilateral. Operation Provide Comfort involved participants from over 20 nations, Restore Hope had 35, Able Sentry 14, Support Hope 17, Uphold Democracy 27, and Joint Endeavor will involve over 30. The complexity of peace operations is further exacerbated by the presence of myriad non-governmental organizations (NGOs) throughout a given operational sector. For example, there were 132 NGOs registered with the United Nations during Restore Hope, 70 during Support Hope, and 164 are registered and operating throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. NGOs have not only been increasing in numbers, but the scope of their missions have been expanding as well. The roles of early warning, monitoring human rights, and conflict resolution activities have been added to the traditional functions of relief and development.³³ While the Army has expanded the role of the Civil Military Operations

³²Bradley Graham, "Advice to an Incoming General: Be Firm, Friendly," *The Washington Post*, December 12, 1995.

³³Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp. 36-37.

Center to accommodate the required dialogue, the coordination requirements will increase as many new players enter the field.³⁴

The magnitude and diversity of the various players continues to place increasing demands on commanders (especially commanders exercising command jurisdiction over coalition forces) and brings with it a series of new challenges. For instance, the court-martial of Private Brown of a Canadian Airborne Regiment for the torture and death of a Somali, as well as the collateral investigation into the causes of this tragic event sent shock waves through the ranks of the Canadian military.³⁵ Moreover, during the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia mission, soldiers in the Bulgarian battalion were dubbed the "Vulgarians" because of acts of sexual misconduct,³⁶ and in Bosnia and Herzegovina investigations were initiated into allegations of black-marketing, prostitution, and drug dealing by various members of the multinational forces resulting in the expulsion of nineteen Ukrainians and four Kenyans.³⁷ Also in the Balkans, Russian peacekeepers have allegedly diverted U.N. fuel supplies to Serb forces and sold the services of Eastern European prostitutes in exchange for payment in diesel fuel.³⁸

Media Intensive

Contemporary military interventions are typically characterized by low-threat zones enabling unimpeded access by the press. Somalia serves as a case in point. Most military personnel who witnessed the initial phases of Operation Restore Hope on national television retain the visual images of U.S. Navy Seals attempting to conduct a

³⁴See, for instance, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Conference Report: Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations*, Washington, D.C., June 23, 1994.

³⁵Andrew Phillips, "A Few Bad Men," *Macleans*, March 28, 1994, pp. 24-33.

³⁶Dale Van Atta, "The Folly of U.N. Peacekeeping," *Readers Digest*, October 1995, pp. 101-102.

³⁷Post and Brand, "Blues for the Blue Helmets," p. 22.

³⁸Lief and Auster, "The Unmaking of Foreign Policy," p. 35.

stealth, pre-dawn insertion firmly implanted in their minds. But no one was more surprised by the camera lights and reporter presence than the Seals who were the first ashore. Just as the "CNN effect" has been a contributing factor for recent U.S. interventions, today's almost instantaneous news stories have created an immediacy which drives the political process. As Oxford University professor John Adams states, "Today, when the body of a single American is dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the American government reverses its foreign policy and begins a withdrawal from the country."³⁹ Similarly, U.N. Under Secretary for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, has complained that the "impression has been created that the easiest way to disrupt a peacekeeping operation is to kill Americans."⁴⁰ The immediate change in the rules of engagement (ROE) that occurred after the media televised U.S. troops witnessing FAd'H members beating exuberant protesters in Haiti—resulting in the death of one Haitian woman—further illustrates the point. While U.S. soldiers were not permitted to interfere under the previous rules of engagement, they were immediately changed so that soldiers could use both non-lethal and deadly force to prevent the loss of any human life after this incident.⁴¹

Lacking or Limited Rule of Law

All of the interventions studied for this paper were in countries that were lacking or had ineffective judicial systems in place; and were either failing or nascent states. Sheer anarchy perhaps best characterized the situation in Somalia and Rwanda. The legal systems operating in Panama, Haiti, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been severely

³⁹John Adams, "The Role of the Media in Peacekeeping Operations," *Special Warfare*, April 1994, pp. 12-13.

⁴⁰Paul Lewis, "U.N. Official Reproves U.S. Over Plan to Pull Out of Somalia," *The New York Times*, January 30, 1994, p. 10.

⁴¹Altogether, there were five different sets of ROE established during Uphold Democracy. See Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, KS), *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, D-20 to D+40*, December 1994, pp. 119-120.

marginalized, a problem compounded by misdirected or dismantled constabularies. The U.S. military has been called upon to help train constabulary forces which have proven essential in nation building in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti, and may be called upon to a limited extent in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In a draft report, William Rosenau highlights the military's role in recent interventions.⁴² U.S. forces created a police training course and conducted combined patrols with local constabulary forces in Panama. Marines and Army forces helped train what were called 'auxiliary forces' in Somalia, and Army elements were involved in establishing a new constabulary after the Haitian military was disbanded subsequent to the U.S. intervention. While the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has this responsibility, Rosenau argues that ICITAP "has been hampered...[by] the lack of a clear mission, inadequate funding, an inability to deploy quickly and operate with DOD, and poor access to effective personnel."⁴³ While Rosenau makes some valid points, ICITAP's efforts in Haiti have been extremely successful. To date, they have conducted basic law enforcement training for over five thousand personnel who comprise the reconstituted constabulary significantly enhancing the prospects of long-term, democratically based stability. The lack of an effective rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina may also place new demands on the military as the International Police Task Force is established. Although there are legal restrictions placed on U.S. forces when conducting law enforcement training, the military has proven to be the only institution to effectively perform this mission in the early stages of an operation.

⁴²William Rosenau, "Accepting the Unacceptable: Peace Operations, the U.S. Military, and Emergency Law Enforcement," paper presented to the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Biennial Conference (Baltimore, MD), October 22, 1995.

⁴³Ibid, pp. 6-7.

Constrained by Rules of Engagement

The 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team was one of the first units to experience the challenges associated with constrained rules of engagement in a combat zone in recent times. Following Desert Storm, they were charged with establishing a 5,000 square mile security zone in Northern Iraq which denied access to Iraqi forces, promoted peace among the various Kurdish groups, and provided humanitarian assistance to the local population. During the course of expanding the security zone, the battalion developed innovative procedures upon chance encounters with Iraqi forces. Infantry elements immediately went into defensive positions and began digging in. Anti-armor carriers were placed in overwatch, while other elements maneuvered around the flanks of the Iraqi forces which was in sight but out of small arms range of enemy forces. Continuous air cover circled the engagement. Once the strong defensive position was established, unit leaders would initiate negotiations with the Iraqi unit leadership demanding their withdrawal from the security zone.⁴⁴ The battalion also utilized indirect fire illumination extensively to assist in checkpoint operations, to identify and observe belligerent forces, and to demonstrate military presence and the ability to respond at will. This tactic not only demonstrated a show of force but helped magnify the capabilities of the U.S. forces.⁴⁵

During the second U.N. operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), the 10th Mountain Division's quick reaction force most often operated on a graduated response principle which was shaped by the existing rules of engagement and the necessity of minimizing collateral damage. Throughout, the graduated response technique gave belligerents the opportunity to surrender without resorting to violence. In a typical cordon and search mission, the unit would infiltrate, establish a cordon, then use loud speakers

⁴⁴Lawrence G. Vowels and Major Jeffrey R. Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," *Armor*, September-October 1994, pp. 11-12.

⁴⁵Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report No. 62714-89100 (06215), "The Use of Indirect Fire Illum. in Supp. of Low Intensity and Peacekeeping Ops." (mimeo).

informing the belligerents they were surrounded and would be injured or killed if they resisted. If the occupants then failed to surrender, tear gas was used to encourage the belligerents to leave peacefully. If they continued to resist, then entry was forced with the use of concussion grenades followed by apprehension. While the Somalia after-action report highlights successes after applying these techniques, it also describes considerations which must be evaluated before deciding on surprise or graduated response tactic. These include: proximity of innocent by-standers and belligerents, vulnerability to attack, and the potential and impact of attracting crowds.

The fact remains that rules of engagement are complex, and have varied with each such operation. Soldiers have the inherent right of self-defense (use of deadly force) when responding to a hostile act. The ability to respond to hostile intent has been limited to peace enforcement missions and is in general more constrained, complex, and subject to interpretation. In Somalia, for instance, there was some apparent confusion over whether the use of deadly force to prevent theft of weapons or equipment (such as night vision goggles) had been authorized. Although the rules called for a gradual response to hostile intent, the decision of whether or not to allow deadly force in this case was never published.⁴⁶

A review of various official after-action reports and recent articles reinforce the necessity of clearly-defined rules of engagement. The U.S. military has certainly not found itself immune from the inappropriate application of force. Gunnery Sergeant Harry Conde, a U.S. Marine, was convicted of aggravated assault after firing his weapon at a Somali who had reached into his vehicle to steal his sunglasses in 1993. Other unfortunate incidents have led military commanders to reiterate the acute need for training. This requirement applies not only to U.S. forces, but to other coalition forces as well. In Somalia, the senior leadership encouraged coalition forces to adapt the

⁴⁶Jonathan T. Dworken, "Rules of Engagement: Lessons From Restore Hope," *Military Review*, September 1994, pp. 26-34.

existing ROE, and modifications were made by many of the units. Others, such as LTG Daniel Schroeder, commander of the U.S. humanitarian intervention into Rwanda, argue that the rules of engagement should be standardized to accommodate common training across the services.⁴⁷

LTC William Martinez, who served with the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia, writes about the need for unit preparedness: "Part of the training process for any peacekeeping operation must...be ROEs. Creating different scenarios or situations to help soldiers practice the ROEs will help them clarify in their minds the situations in which they can or cannot fire. The time to learn this is before coming under fire or getting into a situation that could cost a life."⁴⁸

Likely to Occur in Austere Environments

With the exception of the U.S. intervention in Panama, each operation studied has been in locations that have been devastated by natural disasters or ravaged by conflict. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew (1993) in Florida, for instance, it appeared as though a nuclear weapon had been detonated. The city was left with a substantially degraded utility infrastructure and a majority of homes, buildings, and government facilities had been severely damaged or destroyed outright throughout the twenty mile path of the hurricane. In Somalia, the destructive nature of civil war left the country in a similar state. Most buildings had been damaged by the actions of war or looted for building materials. There was no commerce, agriculture, functioning government institutions, or operational utilities. The country had seemingly collapsed into a failed state immersed in total anarchy. Much of the local population was in a destitute state and almost totally dependent upon humanitarian relief.⁴⁹ Since control over the relief supplies became a

⁴⁷LTG Daniel Schroeder, "Lessons of Rwanda," *Armed Forces Journal*, December 1994, pp. 31-33.

⁴⁸LTC William Martinez, "Peace Operations," *Infantry*, May-June 1994, pp. 39-40.

⁴⁹The author served with the 10th Mountain Division during Hurricane Andrew (October-November 1993) and in Somalia (January-February 1993). These observations are his personal recollections.

source of power and wealth, humanitarian efforts often arguably contributed to the continuation of violence.⁵⁰

In and around Rwanda, U.S. forces were met with the impending death of thousands of Tutsi refugees due to malnutrition, exhaustion, and a cholera epidemic. The Hutu-generated genocide reached crisis proportions and left the populations literally incapable of providing for their own.

Dominated by Small and Independent Unit Operations

Small, independent operations are the rule rather than the exception in most operations other than war, and place enormous demands on the young unit leaders. Jim Tice, correspondent for the *Army Times*, reported on the experience of squad leaders charged with observation point duties in Macedonia, one interviewee asserting that: "I know I will never see responsibilities like this again....When we trained for this mission, I heard all the hoopla that squad leaders would run this, and team leaders would run that, and I didn't believe it....But this is reality. If anything goes wrong, it's my fault, or it's the team leader's fault. They have placed great trust and responsibility in us, and that is a good thing for a leader. We couldn't ask for more."⁵¹

In Somalia, 10th Mountain Division operations ranged from the battalion task force to the small team level. Most missions, however, were performed at company level or below. In one article describing such operations, for instance, Lawrence Vowels and Major Jeffrey Witsken note that "junior leaders must be confident and competent to make quick, hard decisions....[The] decisions had to be made while operating relatively

⁵⁰See Pamela Aall, *NGOs and Conflict Management* (Peaceworks #5, February 1996), Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace; Stephen Buckley, "Aid Groups Snared in African Violence," *The Washington Post*, p. A9, January 23, 1996; Bread for the World Institute, *Countries in Crisis* (Silver Spring, MD: 1996); ACTIONAID, *The Reality of Aid 95* (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1995).

⁵¹Jim Tice, "Responsibility comes early," *Army Times*, October 30, 1995, p. 26.

independently and out of communication range with their superiors.”⁵² Likewise, the relatively broad scope of independent, small unit check point operations placed extraordinary demands on junior leaders in Northern Iraq. LTC John Abizaid, the U.S. Army infantry task force commander during Provide Comfort has reinforced this, arguing that “the pressures on junior leaders to make the right decisions were enormous, and there was great temptation to put all checkpoints under centralized battalion control.”⁵³ Abizaid considers his decision to trust the instincts of his subordinates to be one of the primary reasons the mission succeeded.

Similarly, Brigadier General Hurbottle, commander of U.N. forces in Cyprus, has concluded that: “There is no doubt in my mind that the success of a peacekeeping operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests.”⁵⁴ Senior officers have noted the difficulties involved in making snap judgments in an uncertain environment, recognizing that mistakes have been—and will continue to be—made. As Major Martin Stanton recalled during his involvement the Wanwaylen riot in Somalia:

I was the senior man initially on the scene and was responsible for most of the major decisions for the first few hours....

I looked at the looters. My instructions were pretty clear: I was to go and secure the food site....[But] faced with the anarchy before me, it seemed the proper thing was to try to stop [the looting]. I was confident I had sufficient combat power to handle any armed resistance and that the infantry platoon with me could secure the warehouse and eject any looters.

I made the decision to hand out the food....Unfortunately, I did not understand one of the basic economic realities [that] relief supplies *were* money. When I began handing out supplies it was like handing out free money....At one time, I was convinced that unless something was done to force the crowd back, our soldiers were in immediate danger....The threat to the troops was such

⁵²Vowels and Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry,” p. 29.

⁵³LTC John P. Abizaid, “Lessons for Peacekeepers,” *Military Review*, March 1993, pp. 16-17.

⁵⁴See Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, passim.

that...only reinforcements or an extreme measure such as lethal violence could have prevented us from having people killed or injured....

Handing out the food as a crisis-defusing mechanism failed disastrously....I realize that my basic error was in looking at it from an American frame of reference....What I should have asked myself was: Is it worth getting any of my people hurt over? Is it worth killing any Somalis over? What are the consequences of doing nothing?⁵⁵

Demanding a Visible Presence

Unlike conventional operations, which place a premium on stealth when on patrol, in stability operations, patrols are generally used as a means to demonstrate a visible presence, and to obtain vital intelligence or to assess a particular area. In Northern Iraq, for instance, the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team was involved in what became known as the "checkpoint war" once their security zone was established during Provide Comfort. In order to keep the feuding Kurdish groups from engaging one another and the Iraqi forces in check, the team developed a "flying checkpoint" technique where a mounted force (typically infantry, combat engineers, and anti-armor vehicles) would move into areas where Iraqi or guerrilla fighters were known to operate and establish hasty roadblocks. They always had sufficient overwatch involving air cover and mortar support. A quick reaction force including anti-armor and infantry carriers was held in reserve for reinforcement or extraction if necessary.⁵⁶

In Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division's Cavalry Squadron Ground Troop was frequently employed for checkpoint operations. After a daylight reconnaissance, the checkpoint was established after dark and continued to operate throughout the night. Two anti-armor wheeled vehicles were placed at a road checkpoint site with their night vision devices providing early warning. Two other vehicles overwatched for immediate reaction or to intercept vehicles that did not stop. Although a small force, this tactic

⁵⁵Major Martin N. Stanton, "A Riot in Wanwaylen: Lessons Learned," *Army*, December 1994, pp. 24-30.

⁵⁶Vowels and Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," p. 29.

proved sufficient for a low-threat environment and was instrumental in providing a visible presence throughout a very large humanitarian relief sector.⁵⁷

In Haiti, "presence patrols" were employed for this purpose. When conducting an assessment, a patrol would move into a densely populated location. The platoon would break down into squad-sized elements, then work a particular area. The same squad would operate in a given area so the local population would become accustomed to the soldiers, who would often converse with the citizens and business owners. Standard themes such as the purpose of U.S. presence, or what efforts were being taken to establish a legitimate government were included in normal conversations. The patrols also provided the population with significant world and country news. Finally, the patrols were used to identify and assist in local civic projects such as re-roofing a school or moving a small market out of an unsanitary area. This worked so well that the Haiti after-action report acknowledged that "the American Soldier and his presence on the streets, market places, parks, schools, and businesses of the cities and on the roads, fields, and villages of the countryside were the greatest weapon present to prevent oppression. Professionalism and the proper attitude towards the citizens of Haiti established a standard for the Haitian police and military to follow."⁵⁸

Occurring Primarily in Built-up Areas

Most recent military operations occurred in urban terrain, drawing on certain tactics that have not been employed since the Vietnam War. The 2-87 Infantry Battalion of the 10th Mountain Division, for example, was one of the most active units during Operation Restore Hope, and was often involved in independent or combined cordon and search operations. The battalion effectively employed an airborne command post to coordinate

⁵⁷Tice, "Responsibility comes early," p. 26.

⁵⁸Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, KS), *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions*, April 1995, section A-1.

unit actions, thus enabling the commander to quickly move from one side of a town to the other. To minimize the likelihood of friendly fire casualties, vehicles were clearly marked and the unit developed a uniformed graphics technique to divide cities into numbered blocks and put up signs or painted buildings to identify phase lines or control measures for easy reference and rapid movement. Smoke grenades or paint bombs were used to mark buildings to be searched. The unit found squad-sized search teams to be most effective and required visual flank coordination before moving into new buildings when searching a zone. Concertina wire was found to be effective in cordoning an area. The engineers developed a quick employment technique by linking the wire together, securing the base, and dispensing it from a moving truck. Once laid, the wire was staked to increase resistance by making it more difficult for belligerents to flee the area. Wire was typically placed around 0430, before a dawn cordon and search operation, providing an additional element of surprise.⁵⁹

During the Haiti operation, the division found that weapons caches were moving faster than the targeting mechanisms. As a result, a shift from the "known point" technique was developed. Under this system, cache targets are plotted, a zone or target area established, then the zone is occupied by a maneuver force to limit weapons movement. Active patrolling coupled with counter intelligence team human intelligence operations were then used to pinpoint and isolate the cache.⁶⁰

Operation Uphold Democracy provided the 10th Mountain Division with a series of challenges as well. Although it occurred in a permissive environment, there were military operations in urban terrain tactics employed that worked extremely well. Maneuver commanders found that a mix of military police, psychological operations, and linguistic support proved invaluable when conducting routine operations. This mix

⁵⁹Maj. Martin N. Stanton, "Task Force 2-87: Lessons from *Restore Hope*," *Military Review*, September 1994, p. 40.

⁶⁰Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report No. 10450-55759 (00284), "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cache Strike Operations" (mimeo).

of specialists with the normal maneuver force proved essential when assisting or detaining belligerents and was used successfully to prevent or diffuse violence. While mounted forces were used throughout the operation, Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews found they had to develop a procedure to scan dense urban terrain. Commanders found it necessary to have the gunner and Bradley Commander scan a 360 degree field of view from open hatches. In addition, they found the use of 25mm cannon target practice rounds effective in reducing collateral damage.⁶¹

The division also employed innovative crowd control procedures to manage demonstrations involving 50,000 plus personnel in Port-au-Prince in late September 1994. The division's intent was to avoid violence and keep the crowds from destroying facilities and homes and found that doctrinally modified tactics worked extremely well. Showing a unit's strength up front, incorporating psychological operations throughout the demonstrations, using armor as an intimidator, showing a professional appearance, and integrating military police with maneuver forces to diffuse situations at the lowest possible level proved extremely useful.⁶² CH-47 helicopters with water buckets were also placed on stand-by if the demonstrations proved violent.

Prior to operation Restore Hope, there were limited doctrinal tactics for Army aviation in urban terrain. In fact, what limited doctrine there was called for aviation assets to operate on the outskirts of urban areas. As seen in Panama and Somalia, however, army aviation was selected as the tool of choice because of a limited air threat and the need to minimize collateral damage. Army aviation units found the usual attack methods to be invalid because the urban terrain restricted the employment of more than one aircraft on the target because the target "could only be seen along a one gun target

⁶¹Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report No. 10446-22584 (00283), "Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) in a permissive environment" (mimeo).

⁶²Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report No. 10447-74360 (00314), "Crowd Control Techniques" (mimeo).

line.”⁶³ Aviators also learned that running/diving fire techniques tended to be the most effective method of engaging targets, and may in fact prove to be the only reasonable method since 2.75” rockets often cause more collateral damage.

Requiring Psychological and Civil Affairs Integration

The U.S. Army has made tremendous use of psychological affairs and civil affairs units in recent operations. Every after-action report analyzed has reinforced the requirement to integrate these Special Operations Command forces with conventional units. Over the past decade, their utility has increased almost exponentially. Operation Uphold Democracy was the culmination of the previous experiences. Units were able to effectively incorporate recently developed procedures into all levels of the planning process and the execution phase of the operation. The ability to prepare the battlefield for operations ranging from cash for guns (a “chit” system was developed to make it easier for the local population to turn in their weapons) and coordination with a variety of NGOs in preparing the population for the return of Aristide proved essential in minimizing the level and amount of violence experienced.⁶⁴

As discussed in previous sections, the ability of the U.S. military to effectively deal with myriad NGOs has been enhanced by the creation of a separate Civil Military Operations Center. While some observers argue that “NGOs have felt uneasy working with the military,” and “military leaders tend to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed,”⁶⁵ the coordination activities of this center have helped break down the cultural and perceptual barriers between two camps. The 10th Mountain Division capitalized on the use of this structure during the Hurricane

⁶³Center for Army Lessons Learned, *U.S. Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II: 4 May 93 - 31 Mar 94* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CALL, n.d.), section I-6-1.

⁶⁴Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy*, passim.

⁶⁵Aall, *NGOs and Conflict Management*, p. 11.

Andrew disaster relief operation where it was involved in assisting over eighty non-governmental organizations in providing immediate disaster assistance. The lessons the division learned in Florida were tested again just three months later in Somalia in a situation which was significantly more complex because of the hostile environment. Every operation since has capitalized on this organization's ability to work closely with relief organizations to increase both relief efficiency and effectiveness. Civil affairs units have not only augmented the Civil Military Operations Center due to limited staffing in the division G5 (civil/military operations) section, but their teams have also been well integrated into conventional forces. In Somalia, for example, the teams were attached to maneuver elements and helped establish credibility with local village leaders by accommodating routine medical and dental missions and keeping the inhabitants informed of on-going military activities and world news. The relationships they established not only helped diffuse potentially hostile situations but also served to tap a valuable source of intelligence information.

Requiring Extensive Negotiations

Beginning with Operation Just Cause, when U.S. Army personnel negotiated the surrender of General Manuel Noriega, negotiations with belligerent parties has been a recurring theme in U.S. military interventions. In Somalia, leaders down to platoon level were involved in direct negotiations with local clans when trying to determine how to equitably distribute relief supplies to the various elements within a humanitarian relief sector. Senior leaders were also actively engaged. The Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division and his senior leaders were frequently called upon to negotiate settlements between warring factions and were directly involved in disarmament talks. In *Military Review*, General Arnold writes that "Political negotiation was an area that required extensive coordination. The ARFOR [Army Forces] was involved in

negotiations with clan elders in each small town and village.”⁶⁶ To illustrate further, when the 10th Mountain Division was deployed to Haiti, the quick reaction force platoon leader from the 2-14 Infantry Battalion had to respond to a situation in Haiti where it was reported a FAd'H member was being harassed by the local population and had barricaded himself in his house while heavily armed. Although a large crowd had gathered around the house, the young platoon leader was able to effectively negotiate a peaceful resolution with the FAd'H member and local crowd.⁶⁷

LTC Abizaïd also recounts experiences in Northern Iraq, emphasizing the importance of negotiations occurring at the junior leader level during routine checkpoint operations. Leaders were faced with such challenges as when Kurdish guerrillas wanted to pass through to attack Iraqi forces or Iraqi civil authorities wanted to pass through to arrest local Kurdish leaders. In many cases the young leader was faced with what was perhaps the most important negotiation challenge of a lifetime.⁶⁸

THE CHALLENGE SUMMARIZED

Although today's military leadership correctly argues that warfighting remains the most difficult mission and must remain the primary focus of training efforts, commanders who have participated in recent deployments unequivocally argue that operations other than war differ significantly from conventional operations and require additional skills. The ability of a unit to operate effectively in contingency operations is directly linked to a leader's ability to apply the supporting operational principles. The very nature of these operations mandates a training strategy to accommodate the challenges resulting from

⁶⁶Maj. Gen. S. L. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review*, December 1993, p. 33.

⁶⁷Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report No. 10446-58571 (00286), "Search and Clear—'Wait them out'" (mimeo).

⁶⁸Vowels and Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," pp. 17, 19.

the complex environmental framework. To succeed, the Army must train commanders and staffs to deal with the lack of strategic direction and to effectively accommodate the likely expanded scope of such operations. It requires a greater depth of task knowledge and increased proficiency. Units must be prepared to operate in an urban terrain employing unconventional warfare tactics. They must know how to conduct a cordon and search operation, establish and operate checkpoints, and be proficient in crowd control techniques. They must be capable of performing effectively in austere environments that are lacking in intelligence, with populations that have different political and cultural orientations, and in areas of the world that are lacking commonly accepted rule of law principles.

The leadership and unit training challenge is significant. The normal interface which typically occurs between coalition forces with different values and beliefs and an expanding NGO community must be recognized up-front. The presence of the media throughout the area of operations represents a reality that soldiers and commanders must come to terms with since the inappropriate behavior of a single soldier can be instantaneously transmitted to the world, prompting national-level debates or public outcry. These factors, as well as the requirement for soldiers to shift rapidly from providing humanitarian assistance tasks to conducting combat operations constrained by constrictive rules of engagement, magnifies the challenge. Finally, the importance of developing negotiation skills must be a training priority. This requirement has been best articulated in a article recently published in *Parameters*: "Officers and NCOs [non-commissioned officers] will be in close contact with combatant and noncombatant groups in situations where decentralized diplomacy and on-the-spot negotiating skills can diffuse a volatile situation, possibly saving American, allied, and noncombatant lives. We cannot place the lives of those officers and NCOs at risk by failing to prepare for the challenges of negotiating under adverse conditions with individuals from different

cultures. We have to find ways to adapt our formal training of officers and NCOs to develop the skills they will need in such situations.”⁶⁹

Because of the unique nature of these types of missions, and given the high probability for continued military interventions, this author, as well as most leaders who participated in recent operations, agree that the Army must incorporate stability operations training into all professional military education courses starting with the basic non-commissioned officers course (BNCOC) and continuing through senior service college (SSC). Units that are likely to deploy on contingency operations short of war must adapt their training strategy accordingly. How well the Army has responded to this challenge will be elaborated upon in subsequent sections of this paper.

THE RESPONSE

In each operation analyzed for this report, strategic and tactical errors were made by the U.S. Army. Instead of trying to cover-up or downplay mistakes, the Army has painstakingly documented them in an attempt to minimize the probability of reoccurrence in subsequent missions. During an interview well after Operation Just Cause had been concluded, General Thurman, former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, was not ashamed to point out that he had primarily focused his efforts on the warfighting phase of the operation, while neglecting the post-conflict phase of the campaign plan.⁷⁰ Honesty has been replicated by others such as Major Martin Stanton, when discussing his unit's actions in Wanwaylen, Somalia.

This type of candor is complemented by comprehensive after-action reports produced by the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The

⁶⁹William A. Stoft and Gary L. Guertner, "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention," *Parameters*, Spring 1995, p. 41.

⁷⁰Shultz, *In the Aftermath of War*, p. 16.

Center, which normally sends a team on each operation, documents events and provides specific recommendations for improvement. It is through their observations and recommendations that command and control procedures, management of the various battlefield operating systems, planning and staff supervision techniques, organizational structures required for similar missions, and other functional systems are enhanced. The reports, which average over 200 pages in length, may come in multiple volumes (the Haiti mission had three) and provide hundreds of recommendations for improvement. These recommendations are then tracked to insure they are implemented within funding constraints or provided as candidates for further analysis. The value of these documents does not go untapped, but rather is inherently useful in the training process. Units deploying on similar missions use the reports to assist in the planning and force packaging process. Army Branch Service Schools also rely on them to update doctrine and supporting tactics and procedures which are taught in all professional military education courses.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

To accurately depict the Army's training responses to post-Cold War challenges, interviews were conducted with key personnel at many of the Army's major training schools. Doctrinal and training innovations will be discussed for combat arms initiatives and the institutional changes occurring within the Army's more senior level courses offered at the Army Command and General Staff College.⁷¹

⁷¹See Appendix I for similar discussion of combat support arms and combat service support initiatives. See Appendix II for treatment of the Army War College's professional military education for operations other than war.

Combat Arms Initiatives

The U.S. Army Infantry School has been one of the lead proponents of revising its doctrine and instruction to adequately reflect post-Cold War operational challenges. The school has included specific tactics for operations other than war in all of its recently published tactical manuals. FM 7-30, *The Infantry Brigade*, was published in October 1995 and contains a twenty page appendix on operations other than war. The basic branch manuals covering infantry battalion and company operations, FM 7-20 and FM 7-10, have relevant appendices covering low-intensity operations as well. The changed world situation and increased mission frequency has also resulted in the timely publication of FM 7-98, *Operations in a Low -Intensity Conflict*, as of 1992. Based on a published and well circulated concept paper on peace enforcement operations, FM 7-98 is being updated to incorporate many of the lessons learned in the Somalia and Haiti operations, as well as the predeployment training for the current mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, because of the increase in operations occurring in an urban terrain, a ninety-five page change to FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas*, was issued in October 1995 adding seven tactics-dominated appendices.

The Infantry School's doctrinal efforts have been supplemented by a concurrent project to develop a viable training support package for units scheduled to deploy for contingency operations. This publication, TC 7-98-1, *Training Support Package for Operations Other Than War*, will contain detailed instructor notes, lesson outlines, and paper slides to support classroom and lane training. Tactics that are likely to be performed in future missions have been included so that a unit may quickly establish a predeployment training program focusing on only those tasks that are likely to be performed based on the initial mission analysis. This publication, which will be published in early 1996, has been validated during numerous Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations and was used to assist both the 10th Mountain Division before

its deployment to Haiti and units undergoing Joint Endeavor predeployment training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC).

Supported by current doctrine that is relevant to today's operational environment, classroom instruction and field training has adjusted as well. The officer advanced course is based on a small group instruction format that is led by highly qualified Captains and Majors who have successfully commanded companies which participated in recent operations or have been through rotations at one of the combat training centers. Their experience proves invaluable when doctrinal principles and tactics are being discussed. To ensure that students have mastered the concepts, a six day block of time is set aside to concentrate specifically on operations other than war. The first two days cover doctrinal reviews, small group discussions, and practical exercises involving the sixteen relevant missions (see footnote 1). The following four days are devoted to staff exercises and after-action reviews where the students, acting as a battalion staff, go through the deliberate planning process for three separate missions. The first involves an infantry battalion task force being deployed to a rioting zone within a large metropolitan area. The second is based on a Central American scenario where an infantry battalion task force is assigned the mission of finding, fixing, and destroying drug laboratories while opposed by a belligerent infantry battalion that is operating throughout the area of responsibility and responding to a drug cartel's orders. The final exercise involves a noncombatant evacuation operation on the fictional island of Cortina. The deliberate planning for these types of missions reinforces doctrinal principles and supporting tactics. The advance course also televises the monthly National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center teleconferences where performance trends are candidly discussed based upon recent unit rotations.

In the officer basic course, the focus is clearly on developing platoon leaders' combat skills. Each class is organized as a platoon with leadership positions rotating throughout this sixteen week course. Each platoon has a Captain and two non-

commissioned officers to advise and lead students through the course. It culminates with a five day field training exercise where the young officers' tactical knowledge is tested in a simulated combat environment. In addition to conventional operations, the exercise exposes the officers to scenarios that are constrained by rules of engagement, occur in urban settings, and require negotiations to end disputes.

The small group discussion approach is also in place at the Infantry School's Non-Commissioned Officer Academy. Although the program of instruction only devotes one hour to operations other than war, the normal dialogue occurring within the small groups gives others the mission flavor since NCOs with experience in contingency operations are present in almost every class.

Within the Army Armor School similar efforts have been taken. The Armored and Mechanized Infantry doctrinal manuals from the Company through the Brigade, Field Manuals 71-1 through 71-3, have been or are in the process of being updated to incorporate separate chapters on stability operations. While the training focus within the Armor community appropriately remains on the combat critical tasks expected on the high- to mid-intensity battlefields, a concurrent training strategy has been implemented to make junior leaders proficient in the tactics employed in recent operations.

In addition to presenting and discussing operations other than war principles in the Non-Commissioned Officer Courses and Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, training vignettes have been added to officer field training and situational training exercises. As part of the Basic Course's ten day tactical training exercise, future armor and scout platoon leaders have the opportunity to participate in likely contemporary missions such as establishing a hasty roadblock, conducting area security, patrolling, constructing and manning observation and listening posts, and performing convoy escort and security. This training is then supplemented with small group discussions of the mounted force's role in contingency operations as well as the lessons that have been captured in recent operations. The Armor advanced course has developed a five

day module for operations other than war. The training encompasses a series of situational training exercises set in a Bosnia and Herzegovina scenario that requires the employment of tactics and procedures ranging from company team to brigade task force. This instruction, which is aided by recently developed mission training plans, helps prepare armor officers for line as well as staff duties.

The Army Aviation School has expanded its doctrine to incorporate the lessons learned from recent operations as well. Its capstone doctrine, FM 1-100, *Army Aviation Operations*, is in the final update phase and clearly depicts aviation's combat, combat support, and combat service support tasks in operations other than war. The manual organizes these activities into three main categories: security and limited conflict, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and support to domestic authorities providing detailed descriptions of likely missions—such as show of force, noncombatant evacuation operations, and peace enforcement. The supporting manuals, FM 1-111, *Aviation Brigades*, FM 1-112, *Attack Helicopter Operations*, and FM 1-113, *Utility Helicopter Operations*, are also in the update process. Capitalizing on after-action reports and interviews with those participating in recent operations, each of these publications devote significant attention to these contingency missions. FM 1-111 has an eight page operations other than war appendix and FMs 1-112 and 1-113 reinforce the necessary tactics to operate effectively during these types of missions.

Utilizing this evolving doctrine, the aviation community has been able to provide the necessary orientation for its junior leaders. As with other combat arms branches, the aviation focus remains on combat skills. These skills are skillfully complimented with operations other than war excursions incorporated throughout the one year flight training and basic course instruction. Non-commissioned officers are provided a doctrinal overview as part of their course of instruction in the NCO Academy. In the Advanced Course, the school maximizes simulation in its flight training and staff instruction. It includes a five phase staff exercise where students must plan for

deployment, forced entry, mid- and low-intensity combat, and stability and support missions. The officers have the opportunity to observe probable outcomes when their plans are run through a warfighting simulation model. By modeling likely outcomes, concepts are reinforced through detailed discussions when the simulation violates the established rules of engagement.

The special forces community has taken a slightly different approach. The U.S. Army/John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center has published a series of "White Papers" containing current thought and interim doctrine evolving from the experiences of recent operations. These papers are then widely circulated to Special Operations Command units for their comments and critiqued in detail during doctrinal conferences. These resulting concepts will be placed in their capstone manual, FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*, which is near the publication stage. Once approved for distribution, the supporting doctrinal manuals FM 31-20, *Special Forces Operations*, FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*, and FM 41-10, *Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, will go through similar processes. Until this is completed, the "White Paper" supporting each of these functional areas will be used to augment the concepts and procedures contained in the existing manuals and taught in the basic special forces qualification course and other specialized training schools within the special operations community.

Command and General Staff College

As would be expected, the ten month college that prepares majors for staff duties from the battalion to the unified or specified command levels has expanded its instruction for military operations other than war. In addition to being exposed to these activities during the normal classroom discussions that follow doctrinal readings, each student attends a fifteen day core course.

The first three lessons cover the general concepts, principles and activities, covering in detail the root causes of conflict. As part of these lessons, (which are small group based) each student must give a ten minute oral brief on one of the sixteen contingency missions using a historical example. A lesson is devoted to an expanded mission analysis model that covers the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational aspects of national power, which is then applied to Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq. Once the students have demonstrated they have a firm understanding of the technique, they perform a Vietnam mission analysis using an early 1960s frame of reference. This is followed by a pre-occupation Haitian scenario, where the students are required to develop a course of action decision brief for the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command.

Other lessons cover senior level leadership responsibilities which include developing the desired end-state, success criteria, vision, and supporting unit training strategy. Separate sections are also devoted to nation-building, counter-insurgency, combating terrorism, domestic support, counter-drug, and humanitarian assistance operations. These classes are supplemented with presentations by guest speakers from the State Department, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and noted experts in a variety of fields. Select case studies are also discussed, such as the counter-insurgency operations in El Salvador (1980s) and, more recently, the San Francisco earthquake (1989) and Los Angeles riots (1992). The course concludes with mission analysis and decision briefs for hypothetical follow-on missions in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Command and General Staff College has developed elective courses in Logistics in operations other than war, Nation Assistance, and Peace Operations which are similar in design and content to the War College classes that are discussed in greater detail below. Students may also take a "Research in Military Operations Other

Than War" elective where a manuscript-length monograph is written for possible publication.

UNIT TRAINING

War-fighting, specifically the ability to fight and win this nation's wars, remains—properly so—the central focus of Army training. For the past two decades, the Army has incrementally improved in its ability to train units for combat. In addition to having demanding home station training, establishment and continuous upgrades to the Combat Training Centers⁷² has occurred; and these remain the cornerstone of the Army's training strategy. These Centers, which use state of the art training devices to simulate casualties and equipment losses, host up to Brigade-level task forces for intensive two to three week field training exercises. During the course of a rotation, a unit will have the opportunity to practice many of its wartime missions: infiltration, search and attack, passage of lines, attack/counter attack by fire, assault, etc., all against a world class opposition force which is permanently assigned to the center, is well-trained, and is familiar with the local terrain. After each operation, after-action reviews are conducted which detail the unit's activities during the course of the mission and highlight causal factors for mission success or failure. Most unit commanders who have fought in combat and participated in these exercises will agree that a combat training center rotation is more difficult than the conflict they participated in. The goal is for every combat arms battalion to go through a rotation at least once every two years.

The Army has made equal strides in enhancing the training made available to Division and Corps Staffs. The Battle Command Training Program, a part of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, was designed to develop and

⁷²The Army has three Combat Training Centers: The National Training Center (California), the Joint Readiness Training Center (Louisiana), and the Combat Training Maneuver Center (Germany).

test the skills of Division and Corps commanders and their staffs. During the typical "Warfighter Exercise," commanders and staffs go through the rigors of the deliberate planning process. They redefine the mission, develop the commander's intent, desired end-state, success criteria, and possible courses of action based upon the receipt of a mission tasking derived from a likely conflict scenario. After war-gaming each alternative, a decision briefing is given where the optimum course of action is selected. The decision is then translated into a written campaign plan which serves as the friendly force input in what will become a series of computer simulated battles. Like the Combat Training Centers, the Battle Command Training Program has a staff acting as an opposition force which also develops a plan comprising the other half of the gaming process. Over the course of these two week command post exercises, adjustments to the base plan are made resulting from the output of the simulated battles. These exercises are typically scheduled once every two years for each Corps and Division.

Using the above base training methodology, this section of the paper will examine how the Army has adjusted home station unit training and combat training center rotations to better prepare units for the realities of the post-Cold War environment. A review of the 10th Mountain Division's predeployment training strategies for Restore Hope in Somalia and Restore Democracy in Haiti, as well as the 1st Armored Division's train-up for Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and Herzegovina will demonstrate that the Army's training approach has matured by capitalizing on lessons learned and integrating new doctrinal concepts. In essence, the predeployment training strategy for each mission has built upon and improved the approach taken previously—the Army has never liked to re-invent the wheel.

Operation Restore Hope

Operation Restore Hope (1992-93) was the second in a series of post-Cold War deployments that would test the Army's ability to conduct humanitarian interventions. It

is important to put the division's readiness strategy in a historical context prior to discussing the training plan for this mission. The 10th Mountain Division's mission essential task list included: deploy, conduct a movement to contact, deliberate attack, area defense, and act as an Army Forces Headquarters. The infantry battalion's mission essential task list included instructions: to deploy, conduct a meeting engagement, search and attack, and infiltrate; a passage of lines, relief in place, tactical road march, assault, attack/counterattack by fire, and also attack and defend in urban terrain. The infantry battalion commanders had also reached a general consensus that cohesion, discipline, leader development, physical readiness, and frequent combined arms live fires strengthens units. They focused their training efforts accordingly.⁷³

In this particular case, the division had been given little preparation time for the mission. Indeed, the first combat unit to deploy to Somalia, 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, had only eleven days to prepare. During this time, in addition to conducting a concurrent mission analysis with the Division and Brigade staffs and undergoing normal administrative processing for overseas movement, the battalion focused small unit training on convoy, check-point, and cordon and search operations. They also conducted health and sanitation training, conducted a basic country orientation seminar, and trained on a series of eight vignettes that had been developed to familiarize soldiers with the already established rules of engagement. Similar approaches to predeployment training were occurring with other deploying units. At the same time, the Division Headquarters was focusing its efforts on deploying subordinate units and continuing its mission analysis as the situation matured and more information became available.

The division also sought the advice of recent operation participants and personnel with an expertise in Somalia. LTC John Abizaid, who commanded the 3rd Battalion, 325th Infantry (Airborne Combat Team) during Provide Comfort in Northern

⁷³Telephone interview with LTC Jim Sikes, former commander of the 2nd battalion, 87th Infantry, whose unit was the first to deploy to Somalia from the 10th Mountain Division on February 19, 1993.

Iraq, and Andrew Natsios from the Agency for International Development were brought in for this purpose. Their insights were instrumental in developing a predeployment training strategy that proved relatively effective given the short deployment notice. In hindsight, crowd control and negotiations were the only critical tasks that were not contained in the unit's mission essential task list or predeployment training plan.

Mission Fallout From Restore Hope

The U.S. and U.N. missions in Northern Iraq and Somalia not only provided the impetus to expand Army doctrine and professional military education, but also resulted in other institutional changes that would enhance the Army's ability to achieve specific military objectives.

To this end, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute was established in 1993 as a part of the Center for Strategic Leadership at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Its mission is to study the strategic and operational implications of peace operations, develop concepts and doctrine for the senior military leadership, and refine interagency coordination through studies, conferences, exercises, and war games. As part of its training charter, the Institute developed an exportable training package for units in the field, and an annual peace operations command post exercise for command-level staff members. As discussed below, the Institute has also been an active player in the predeployment training strategy for subsequent peace operation missions.

Adjustments were also made to the Combat Training Centers as a result of lessons learned from post-Cold War peace operations. The Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk was the first to expand its peace operations strategy at the direction of the Army Chief of Staff. General Lawson Magruder finalized the design for two rotations that were entirely focused on peace operations.⁷⁴ The first occurred in

⁷⁴The initial redesign was started in January 1993 under the leadership of Brigadier General George A. Fisher, Jr., the Center's Commanding General. The project was finalized under Brigadier General Lawson Magruder III, who assumed command in July 1993 after an assignment as the Assistant Division

November 1993, based on a border dispute scenario that required a Brigade-sized task force to conduct a forced entry, establish a lodgment and movement to the disputed area, enact a defense, and conduct a night attack. The exercise gave unit participants the opportunity to cope with an unclear enemy, deal with civilians and refugees in the combat zone, and coordinate with the other governmental, non-governmental and news agencies which were operating in the area of operation. Units had to apply the rules of engagement when they were required to separate the belligerents, demilitarize a buffer zone, and protect humanitarian relief efforts and the local population. The scenario also included sniper fire and skirmishes between ethnic factions, belligerent checkpoint operations, and ambushes along supply routes.⁷⁵ The second peace operations rotation was conducted in August 1994 and, while similar in design to the first rotation, was expanded to include the participation of a division staff. The Center now has the capability to tailor a rotation focused entirely on a peace enforcement mission.

These exercises have validated operations other than war type scenarios which are included as part of each rotation. A typical exercise today is based on a scenario involving a conventional operation that is tailored to the participating unit's mission essential task list. However, commanders will experience the types of situations faced by units in recent deployments. They are required to deal with local civil leaders, media, civilian refugees, and other governmental and non-governmental organizations that are operating throughout the simulated combat zone. All rotations face this type of situation, but the degree changes depending on the focus of the exercise.

Although the U.S. European Command prefers to use the term "stability operations" when referring to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, a similar effort has been undertaken to expand the tasks being performed at the Combat Training

Commander for Operations in the 10th Mountain Division, where he served during the Hurricane Andrew disaster relief operation and as the Task Force/Kismayu commander in Somalia.

⁷⁵Inspector General, Department of Defense, *Catalog of Peace Operations Training Activities*, September 1994, pp. 8-9.

Maneuver Center in Hohnfels, Germany.⁷⁶ The Europe model includes a transition to stability operations after a unit has participated in a training scenario that involves intense conventional operations. To add a dose of reality, civilians, displaced persons, and media players appear throughout the battlefield for the entire rotation. These preliminary efforts have been instrumental in establishing base scenarios which were expanded for the units undergoing predeployment training for peace operations missions in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The National Training Center has taken a similar approach.

Even while Operation Restore Hope was underway, the Center for Army Lessons Learned was also able to respond with training materials. A special edition *Handbook for Somalia* was published in January 1993, covering a country orientation, emerging doctrine, critical tactics, techniques and procedures being employed, preventative medical considerations, and Somali customs. The handbook was used to assist follow-on units in their predeployment training. This was followed by a seventy page *Operations Other than War* newsletter published in December 1993, specifically devoted to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. In addition to providing insights into the environmental framework for these types of missions, tactics and accompanying lessons learned on checkpoint, convoy, and military operations in urban terrain were discussed in detail. In July 1994, a *Handbook for the Soldier in Operations Other Than War* was published containing many of the tactics and procedures developed in recent operations; it also included tips on force protection. The Center has also produced recent pamphlets on other contingency missions including civil disturbance, disaster assistance, and counter-drug operations.

In addition to the institutional changes resulting from these contemporary operations, the Army was filling its ranks with officers experienced in peace operations

⁷⁶Jim Tice, "The Busiest Major Command," *Army Times*, October 30, 1995, pp. 22-24.

who would play a vital role in assisting with the training of leaders for subsequent missions.

Operation Restore Democracy

Unlike the virtually no-notice deployment to Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division received its warning order for the Haiti mission in early August 1994. Since the first troops did not arrive in country until September 19th, the division had a month and a half to prepare for the operation. The division quickly began planning for what was anticipated to be a peace enforcement mission requiring a forced entry. While most of the soldiers within the division had served in Somalia, normal personnel turn-over left roughly 25 percent of the officers in need of leader training on the nature of peace operations.

The division selected its 1st Infantry Brigade to be the lead task force, which then developed a comprehensive training plan consisting of a series of command post, field training, and live fire exercises. The brigade also conducted country orientations and training in negotiations, media relations, and other specialized topics. To achieve greater efficiency and standardization in preparing its maneuver battalions, the brigade developed three situational exercise lanes which took five days each to complete. The first lane was defense of a fixed site and included tasks such as handling detainees, refugee control, hasty road blocks, and static security operations. The second lane was devoted to a day and night company raids involving a live fire exercise which required synchronization of fire support elements including Air Force C-130 gunships. It also included convoy escort, reaction to an ambush live fire exercise, and air assault and attack situations. The third lane was devoted to operations in an urban terrain and included a live fire exercise and civil disturbance training. As part of the brigade's strategy, reinforcement training was conducted on critical individual tasks; all soldiers were required to qualify with their individual weapon and undergo training on the rules of

engagement.⁷⁷ According to the 1st Brigade Commander, knowing and training on the rules of engagement were the most difficult training tasks since there were separate rules established for each phase of the operation. This was further exacerbated by additional changes that occurred as a result of inappropriate use of force by the FAd'H against local citizens.⁷⁸

The contingency plan called for an air assault from a Navy aircraft carrier, an action which necessitated supplemental training for the Division's aviation brigade. Since this platform had never been used by a large Army conventional aviation unit, aviators had to become deck landing certified. This certification training occurred during the month of August aboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt. Full dress rehearsals for the planned air assault occurred September 16-17 while enroute to the area of operation aboard the USS Eisenhower.⁷⁹

To assist in predeployment training, the Center for Army Lessons Learned was able to produce a handbook that covered an introduction to and overview of the current situation in Haiti, recently employed tactics and procedures, preventative medicine considerations, and common Haitian conversational phrases in July 1994. This was used as an aid in country orientation and tactical training for support troops.

While units were executing their recently developed training plans, the Division Headquarters, assisted by Fort Leavenworth's Battle Command Training Program and the XVIII Airborne Corps Staff, was identifying the personnel requirements to operate as a Joint Task Force (JTF). Once the augmentation personnel had arrived, which included liaison officers from each service and other government organizations such as the Department of State, the staff became immersed in the planning process. New staff members were quickly trained on the division's standard operating procedures, and the

⁷⁷Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy*, December 1994, pp. 2-4.

⁷⁸Telephone interview with Colonel Andy Berdy (USA), Washington, D.C., February 22, 1996.

⁷⁹Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy*, December 1994, pp. 161-62.

mission analysis was updated in accordance with additional guidance. By capitalizing on lessons learned in Somalia, the division was able to efficiently organize for the task at hand. Because of limited missions, division artillery and air defense personnel were used to augment the Civil-Military Operations Center which was again about to play a major mission role. By the time the division deployed, its headquarters was well organized and trained to assume the role of a Joint Task Force.⁸⁰

Follow-on Initiatives

The U.S. military was not only involved in training its own forces, but extended its expertise to other participants as well. As part of the plan to efficiently transition control to the United Nations Mission in Haiti, the Army's Battle Command Training Program, Joint and Combined Operations Group, was given the assignment to assist in the training of the newly created staff. The stated objective of the training program was to "...produce a combined staff that can plan, coordinate, and conduct U.N. peace operations in Haiti...[build] a cohesive team with the ability to perform deliberate and crisis action planning, and interact with the U.N. civilian staff, Haitian Government, non-governmental organizations, the populace and media."⁸¹

The Battle Command Training Program brought in personnel from the Army's branch schools, the U.N. staff, U.S. Atlantic Command, and other experts such as the head of the Haitian Institute at the University of Kansas to develop a structured week-long program of instruction and recently drafted standard operating procedures. The training was conducted in Haiti from March 5-10, 1995, and consisted of a country orientation, discussion of the roles and missions of other governmental and non-governmental organizations, refinement of the planning standard operating procedures,

⁸⁰Telephone interview with Colonel Jim Campbell (USA), former Chief of Staff for the 10th Mountain Division during their engagement in Haiti, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1996.

⁸¹Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy*, July 1995, p. 67.

three exercises involving civil-military cooperation and requiring use of the tactical decision making process, and initial planning for scheduled Haitian elections. The program was well received by the two hundred military and civilian participants and greatly assisted in the team building process. The Army's after-action report attributes this program's success to the personal involvement of the incoming U.N. Mission in Haiti Force Commander, Major General Joseph W. Kinzer.⁸²

As a separate initiative, Army special operations forces were active in training multinational force participants from seven Caribbean nations. A course was developed by the 3rd Special Forces Group, designed to reinforce basic infantry skills and build unit cohesion for what would become a composite "Caricom Battalion" about to deploy to Haiti. This predeployment training was conducted in Puerto Rico, and was a significant factor contributing to this mission's success.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned continued to produce relevant materials, such as the *Peace Operations Training Vignettes Newsletter*, published in March 1995. This was used as a training tool for a 25th Division (light Infantry) brigade task force, which was scheduled to replace 10th Mountain Division units about to redeploy to Fort Drum, New York. The newsletter contained tactics and procedures for tasks to be performed, such as patrolling, fixed site security, checkpoint, cordon and search, voting place security, and other operations. The Joint Readiness Training Center also continued to play an important role in preparing units for peace operations duties. The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the third combat replacement unit, went through a predeployment rotation focusing on the known tasks such as patrolling, traffic control, force protection, convoy escort, weapons seizure, and quick reaction force operations. The unit placed considerable attention on rules of engagement training, which was incorporated as a part of each training mission. Significantly, this episode represents

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 61.

the first time a unit went through predeployment training at a combat training center, and was itself a prima facie rationale for mission success.

Operation Joint Endeavor

The Army in Europe has been redefining its focus ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm reinforced the lesson that the United States Army in Europe needed to have a force projection capability. Indeed, this lesson had become well ingrained within the NATO military establishment, ultimately giving birth to its Rapid Reaction Corps. Appropriately, the training focus also shifted from the defense of western Europe to preparing for contingency operations elsewhere. Starting in 1993, the shift in training strategy included major training center peace operations rotations for Infantry and Armored Brigades within the 1st Armored Division, a Battle Command Training Program exercise based on a Bosnia and Herzegovina scenario, and planning exercises with Partnership for Peace (PFP) members. These latter exercises incorporated field training on peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations.⁸³ In September, the "Cooperative Bridge '94" training exercise was conducted in Poszan, Poland with six NATO and six PFP participants. This initial exercise led to subsequent deployments with former Warsaw Pact states which included peace operations rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center. These exercises and peacekeeping operations in Macedonia set the stage for the predeployment training strategy about to be executed by the 1st Armored Division Task Force for Operation Joint Endeavor.

As in previous operations, the division established specific qualifications for individual soldiers and units before deployment. Some of the general requirements included weapons qualification, mask confidence, soldier common tasks, dealing with

⁸³Sarah B. Sewall, "Peace Operations: A Department of Defense Perspective," *SAIS Review*, Winter/Spring 1995, p. 128.

the media, anti-fratricide, law of land warfare, code of conduct, and friend/foe identification. Theater-specific training was conducted on mine awareness, checkpoint operations, cold weather, rules of engagement, country orientation, and force protection. Crew and platoon qualification training was also conducted, as well as training for rail- and air-load teams.

Collective skills were enhanced by a series of situational training exercises encompassing rules of engagement, mine operations, patrolling, checkpoints, assault, actions on the objective, and logistic support. A series of fire coordination and deployment exercises were also conducted. The culminating events were Combat Maneuver Training Center validation exercises for deploying units that were linked to simultaneous division task force command post exercises which extended over the course of several months. To add realism, a team from the Army's Peacekeeping Institute was brought in to assist in negotiating training. The teams' guidance from the V Corps Commander, Lieutenant General John N. Abrams, was: "Using a well trained cadre of role players, confront the command with a spectrum of culturally accurate, interest based situations designed to provide a laboratory in which the commander's experience the challenges of up to the worse-case scenarios."⁸⁴ With the assistance special operations command personnel and Balkan experts, Institute personnel developed a series of simulations to facilitate the conduct of a "Joint Military Commission" to resolve issues. Balkan leaders were played by personnel who were well versed on the situation and familiar with the culture and leadership style of the person they were role playing. Issues ranged from determining meeting structure, to adjudicating how the zone of separation was to be controlled and to potential violations of the peace accords. These joint commission scenarios were integrated throughout the

⁸⁴Telephone interview with Colonel Ed McCarthy (USA), Washington D.C., February 29, 1996.

command post exercises and were used to enhance the negotiating skills of the division's senior leaders.

Clearly, the division's strategy encompassed the lessons from other deployments and was specifically tailored to the demands of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The division was ready after what in reality was three years of preparation.

CONCLUSIONS

As U.S. policy on the employment of military force has evolved from the Weinberger doctrine to the operational principles embodied in Presidential Decision Directive - 25, the Army's training strategy has adjusted course as well. As General George A. Joulwan, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. European Command, argues: "With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military now has to focus on worldwide 'peacetime engagements' in operations other than war with the same degree of commitment as it prepared to fight and win its combat roles."⁸⁵ After evaluating how the Army has adjusted its training strategy to accommodate the post-Cold War realities, it is evident that General Joulwan's challenge has been answered with enthusiasm and excellence. The U.S. Army has been able to maintain its warfighting edge while simultaneously expanding its playbook to accommodate the myriad tasks associated with contemporary peace operations. Efforts to revise doctrine, professional military education instruction, and unit training strategies have made the U.S. Army the world's premier peacekeeper.

The Army has learned to operate comfortably within the environmental context of peace operations by learning from past mistakes and applying new doctrine and tactics. Its leadership understands the new operational principles and knows how to apply them;

⁸⁵General George A. Joulwan, "Operations Other Than War: A CINC's Perspective," *Military Review*, February 1994, pp. 5-10.

they were clearly taken into consideration when the Dayton Peace Accords were drafted (1995). Today, where strategic guidance is lacking, clarification of the desired political objectives is sought by the military leadership before developing the mission statements and tailoring the necessary forces to succeed. To better accommodate the expanded scope of contemporary operations, the military has better defined its role by placing specific language in the peace accords and in congressional testimony.⁸⁶ The use of checklists has been institutionalized to optimize the human intelligence available to commanders and civilian leaders involved in interventions and there is unprecedented cooperation between the various intelligence agencies involved in peace operations.

In addition, the Army has intensified training in urban environments and routinely incorporates rules of engagement in exercise play. Its Combat Training Centers have expanded their scenarios to incorporate peace operation missions testing a unit's ability to apply appropriate small unit tactics whose success often hinges on effectively integrating psychological operations and Civil Affairs personnel into the fold. Predeployment training covers detailed cultural orientations, incorporates simulations involving interface with governmental and non-governmental organizations and belligerent parties to enhance negotiating skills. Moreover, the Army has developed

⁸⁶In Annex IA of the Dayton Accords, for instance, the military's role is clearly defined: "IFOR shall have the unimpeded right to observe, monitor, and inspect and force's facility or activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the IFOR believes may have military capability." Indeed, this is an open-ended mission statement which includes, according to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, a "silver bullet clause" authorizing Admiral Leighton Smith "to do whatever he feels is necessary to protect IFOR and to implement his responsibilities." See Holbrooke, testimony before the Senate Foreign Operations subcommittee on Appropriations, December 19, 1995.

According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, "The U.S. and NATO are not going to Bosnia to fight a war. They are not going to Bosnia to rebuild the nation, resettle refugees, or oversee elections. They are not under U.N. control, and there will be no dual-key arrangement. This force will have a clear line of command under NATO and a clear mission. That mission is to implement the peace. The tasks of our forces are clear and limited, and our soldiers understand them. For example, they will mark and monitor a 4-kilometer-wide zone of separation between the three factions. They will patrol this zone of separation, and oversee the withdrawal of forces and weapons away from the zone, back to cantonments. They will enforce the cessation of hostilities. The military objective of all of this is to provide a secure environment in Bosnia, and that will allow the international civilian organizations to start helping the Bosnian people rebuild their nation, resettle refugees, oversee elections, and achieve a stable balance of power." See Perry, defense department briefing, December 11, 1995.

specific strategies to more effectively deal with the media and trains its leaders accordingly. Contemporary military thought has been expanded to consider the tasks required after the conflict or crisis stage of an intervention. Considerable attention has been placed on constabulary reconstitution and rule of law issues which are necessary for the long-term security of the local populations. During the Haiti intervention, the efforts extended to the Judiciary, where Department of State sponsored a 17 member team of legal mentors mandated to train and evaluate the Haitian judicial system.⁸⁷

The Army is not alone in its efforts. Similar innovations are occurring within the joint community and other governmental and non-governmental agencies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expanded its doctrine to include a capstone manual on military operations other than war which is complemented by seven supporting publications including doctrine for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and domestic support operations. Each of the combatant commanders-in-chief have conducted exercises which include peace operations scenarios involving participation of other potentially affected governmental and non-governmental agencies. The Army Peacekeeping Institute and the U.S. Institute for Peace conduct interagency and non-governmental organization training and joint seminars on conflict resolution. The military's Senior Service Colleges have expanded allocations for non-defense participants. The United Nations has expanded its training efforts as well. These initiatives have helped break-down the cultural barriers that isolated many organizations on the playing field creating a synergy that has promoted unparalleled cooperation between the various actors.

Just as the number of peace operations has effectively doubled from 13 during the Cold War to 26 today, there remain plausible operations on the horizon.⁸⁸ Indeed, a

⁸⁷Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operations Uphold Democracy*, July 1995, p 152.

⁸⁸See, for instance, Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. to Back Burundi Peace Force," *Washington Post*, March 3, 1996, p. A3. Since President Clinton's inauguration, the United Nations has undertaken six new peacekeeping operations: Somalia (II), Georgia, Liberia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Only Somalia involved U.S. troops, although the U.S. contributed financially to the others. The late 1995 deployment to Bosnia took place not under the aegis of the U.N. but rather NATO.

conflict-prone international environment underscores the possibility of future, perhaps more frequent engagements. Because of this, the Army must continue to refine its training strategy to accommodate such future challenges. Based upon this research, there are three particular areas that need renewed emphasis. First, it is clear that small units dominate peace operation missions. This notwithstanding, however, only a two hour block of instruction on operations other than war is included in the curriculum of most Non-commissioned Officer Academy courses. The instruction remains almost entirely focused on the types of interventions expected during the Cold War. To better prepare the Army's non-commissioned officer corps for the types of missions that they are likely to experience over the next few decades, the curriculum must be expanded to better reflect today's realities.

Second, there is an acute need to improve the negotiating skills of leaders throughout the Army. To date, this requirement has not received adequate attention within the professional military education system. Indeed, the only formalized course on this subject is an elective at the Army War College. Clearly, by institutionalizing structures such as "Joint Commissions" down to the battalion level, the Army cannot—and should not—risk having its leaders disadvantaged if there is inadequate time for predeployment training. Army leadership training must be expanded to fill this void starting with the non-commissioned officer training courses. To reinforce this knowledge, perhaps the Combat Training Centers could expand play to incorporate negotiation simulations. Operation Joint Endeavor predeployment training establishes a solid base case.

Finally, it is arguable that the Army must expand its training in urban terrain. Recent interventions demonstrate a combined arms approach is necessary for mission success. However, based on personal observations and numerous interviews, most divisions limit urban training to infantry units. Normally, aviation, logistics, field artillery, civil affairs, and other appropriate personnel are not integrated in the training. While this

training shortfall is a function of inadequate training sites, the urban facilities that are currently under construction at the Joint Readiness Training Center should improve the Army's ability to operate in this environment. Site improvements are also necessary at the other combat training centers, branch service schools, and local training areas. For instance, the U.S. Army Armor School has recognized this requirement and has a major construction project in the design phase.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, the Army has generally kept pace with the rigorous and increasing demands on Army forces brought about by peace operations. It has not been without costs, however. The increased frequency of deployments coupled with the additive nature of peace operations training has increased the operational tempo of units to unparalleled levels. In a recent *Army Times* article, for instance, Jim Tice reports that during a three year tour in Europe, soldiers in a armor battalion spend 29 percent of their tour away from home station, 43 percent in a mechanized infantry battalion, and 53 percent for the typical brigade headquarters.⁸⁹ And these statistics were compiled before the Dayton Accords were signed and units deployed for Operation Joint Endeavor. While the operational tempo of tactical units in Europe was driven in part by the potential deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a similar pace is being experienced in other divisions throughout the Army.

This requires an answer to a difficult and problematic question: With increased mission requirements and a continued decline in real defense expenditures, is the Army capable of fielding forces for the two 'nearly simultaneous' combat missions envisioned in contemporary strategic planning while maintaining a quality of life necessary to maintain an all volunteer force? Concerns are being expressed by many that the armed forces may be heading down the 'hollow' path of the 1970s.⁹⁰

⁸⁹Jim Tice, "The Busiest Major Command," *Army Times*, October 30, 1995, p 22.

⁹⁰Current force planning is reflected in Les Aspin, *The Bottom-Up Review* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, September 1, 1993). For contending perspectives on the ability of the U.S. armed forces to accomplish this mission statement, see: Alan Tonelson, "Superpower Without a Sword," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer

Moreover, although training for peace operations is for the most part solid, such training would not be useful if the U.S. government decided that it did not wish to rely upon such missions as a key element of its national security policy. While the Clinton administration has embraced peace operation engagements, Congress resists. Greater cooperation between these two branches of government on this issue would substantially improve military planning and better shape the long-term training needs. All things considered, it is perhaps axiomatic that training is only as useful as the strategy it serves. As the Vietnam and Somalia interventions indicate, tactical success is possible even with strategic failure. Given the shrinking resources dedicated to active U.S. post-Cold War international engagement, this can be ill-afforded.

1993), pp. 166-80; Lawrence G. Korb, "An Overstuffed Military," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (Nov./Dec. 1995), pp. 22-34.

APPENDIX I

Combat Support Arms

The Engineers have been equally aggressive in revising doctrine. Their capstone manual, FM 5-100, *Engineer Operations*, was recently approved and has been placed on the Internet as an experiment to accelerate dissemination pending publication and hard copy distribution. This manual has been completely revised to give a detailed overview of engineer operations from the platoon level through the engineer organizations of the other armed services. Attention is devoted to the specific engineer missions performed throughout a theater, supporting tactics and procedures, and planning considerations for each phase of an operation. The manual also contains a separate chapter on contingency operations describing engineer support to most of the activities broadly characterized as operations other than war. Because of the frequency of contingency operations, the engineer community has devoted most of its effort updating division-level manuals. FM 5-7-30, *Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Operations (Light, Airborne, Air Assault)*, was updated in 1994. This was followed by FM 5-71-3, *Brigade Engineer Combat Operations*, and FM 5-10, *Combat Engineer Platoon*, in 1995. In early 1996, the Engineer School will revise FM 5-7-2, *Combat Engineer Company (Mechanized)*. These manuals devote considerable attention to operations other than war, providing examples of engineer tactics and procedures employed in recent missions. Mine and counter-mine operations have been significantly expanded as well.

This doctrine serves engineer students well. All Non-Commissioned Officer Academy, Basic Course, and Advanced Course students receive branch doctrinal instruction—which is further supplemented with the operational concepts contained in FM 100-5, *Operations*, FM 100-20, *Military Operations Other Than War*, and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. The Engineer Non-Commissioned Officer and Basic Courses

focus on the tactics and procedures employed at the platoon and company levels while the advanced course focus is on battalion task force operations for the first half of the instruction. Echelon above corps missions and contingency operations are the main topics in the second half of the course. Operations other than war tactics and procedures are taught throughout each course, supplemented by staff and field exercises and group discussions.

Since Desert Storm, the military intelligence community has undergone a significant transformation as a result of Army downsizing, technological innovations that significantly enhance information dissemination, and a reduced reliance on signal intelligence capabilities. These factors have reduced the intelligence force structure within the Army by approximately fifty percent, while the intelligence support to field commanders has been enhanced in many respects. These actions have driven a basic restructure of the intelligence doctrine as well. FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, was completely revised in 1994 to emphasize force projection capabilities, intelligence support for joint and combined operations, and recently developed tactics and procedures. A free-standing chapter on operations other than war is also included. This capstone manual has set the stage for revisions to the manuals supporting the various echelons within the Army. At present, FM 34-10, *Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, and FM 34-80, *Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, are in the update process. They are being revised to incorporate many of the lessons learned in recent operations and to expand the sections on force projection and operations other than war. They also focus on the five military intelligence tenants: commander-driven intelligence process, broadcast and dissemination, intelligence synchronization, split based operations, and tactical tailoring. These tenants, first developed after Desert Storm, have directed the efforts to provide more relevant, timely, and accurate information to field commanders.

These manuals will be supplemented with FM 34-8-2, *G2/S2 Handbook*, which is in the preliminary draft stage.

The instruction given within the Military Intelligence School has taken a significantly different focus since the end of the Cold War as well. The basic instruction within the Non-Commissioned Officer, Basic, and Advanced Courses covers the full range of operations other than war. Northern Ireland and other case studies are included, reinforcing intelligence procedures used in real world situations and emphasizing counter-intelligence tactics and techniques employed to assist in the force protection mission. Military intelligence personnel are also trained in how to access the volumes of open-source intelligence within a given area of operation, thus enhancing the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The officer courses also include a four day staff exercise based on a Central American contingency mission and disaster relief scenario. This exercise is used to validate the officers' ability to analyze the various factors (ranging from terrain and vegetation to the belligerent force composition) within an area of operation that impact on the assigned mission.

Military police have been actively engaged in every major operation undertaken since Operation Just Cause. Indeed, the operational tempo of military police units has raised the consciousness of many senior military leaders who are concerned about mission fatigue. The fact remains, military police have the necessary training and skills to perform myriad tasks associated with the various missions undertaken as operations other than war. They have not only been active players in each of the operations studied as part of this research project, but were also major actors in recent migrant camp operations involving Cuban and Haitian refugees, remain deployed on missions in Panama and Honduras, and have significant elements deployed with the IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their primary warfighting manual, FM 19-4, *Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of War*, was updated in 1993. While most of the other military police doctrine is dated, contemporary

concepts and tactics have been incorporated into a comprehensive "White Paper" covering military police support to contingency operations.

The Military Police School has taken a slightly different training approach than others, one which is well-suited to the demands placed upon the law enforcement community. In addition to covering the normal doctrinal material, the Non-Commissioned Officer and Officer Basic and Advance Courses have four primary focus areas: task and skill proficiency, understanding the human dimension and attitude development, camaraderie and team building, and leadership competence. Instruction is based on a "Leadership Excellence Model" which places the student in various roles based on staged situations that teach and stress tasks, conditions, and standards throughout each course of instruction. A former Military Police School Commandant writes in a recent article, "By using active student involvement in scenario-based instruction, the course blends the best of task learning with the key ingredient of learning how to think in challenging situations."⁹¹

Combat Service Support

Within the personnel and logistics community, similar efforts have been taken to update the doctrine and professional military education curriculum. Its capstone doctrine, FM 100-10, *Combat Service Support*, has been recently updated. The new version incorporates many functional operating system enhancements, evolving joint and multinational command and control arrangements, and force structure changes. Innovative concepts like the single stock fund, total asset visibility, split-based operations, and strategic lift enhancements are discussed in detail, as well as the combat service support challenges associated with operations other than war. This manual provides the necessary operational framework and future direction.

⁹¹Brigadier General Salvatore P. Chidichimo, "Training Leaders for a Force Projection Army," *Military Review*, March 1993, pp. 20-25.

Within this community, most of its contingency and wartime functions (arm, fix, fuel, man, move, sustain, and protect the force) are performed on a daily basis while in garrison, thus mandating a somewhat different approach to doctrinal revision. Branch-specific and multi-functional doctrine has been revised to capture innovative tactics, procedures, and force tailoring techniques used to accommodate the varying workload factors associated with each mission category. For example, in a humanitarian operation, the focus is almost entirely on the fueling, moving, and sustaining functions which may extend to the supported civilian community as well. Recent doctrinal updates address these types of planning considerations, as well as the other wartime functions, in detail. FM 10-1, *Quartermaster Principles*, was recently revised along these lines, adding a separate chapter on operations other than war for the first time. The basic transportation manual, FM 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization*, has been similarly updated. Other branch manuals such as FM 12-6, *Personnel Doctrine*, have taken a building block approach which describes the various functions from the battalion through the U.S. sustaining base, and provides historical examples to illustrate doctrinal concepts. Doctrine has also been developed to fill gaps. FM 100-17-3, *Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration*, has been added to the doctrinal inventory to better accommodate the movement of units, personnel and equipment from the port of debarkation to the tactical assembly area.

The combat service support community has tailored its leader development programs just as most other branches have. Non-Commissioned Officer Academies and Officer Basic Courses focus on leadership, technical, and tactical skills at the section, platoon, and company levels, thereby limiting combined arms and operations other than war instruction to broad classroom overviews and discussions. Where appropriate, this instruction may be more extensive. For instance, a two week field training exercise has been incorporated into the Transportation Basic Course instruction where these officers are exposed to many of the types of situations experienced in

operations other than war, such as: making use of force decisions within the imposed rules of engagement, responding to press inquiries, and negotiating with other governmental and non-governmental players.

The quartermaster, ordnance, and transportation branches have an integrated advanced course. The first seven week phase is devoted to leadership, training management, and staff curriculum which helps prepare the officers for company command and staff duties. During the second phase, officers will attend branch specific instruction to improve technical and field skills. For example, the culminating event for quartermaster officers during this five week phase is a sixteen hour command post exercise where the class develops a Corps-level logistics plan for a scenario involving a failed state that has also been plagued by a natural disaster. Transportation and ordnance officers receive similar exposure to operations other than war as well. The last, eight week, multi-functional phase is devoted to division- and corps-level operations. This phase includes a Southwest Asia-based staff exercise where officers must develop a logistics estimate and concept of support which is briefed to an instructor who is acting as the senior logistics officer in theater. The exercise ends with a two day seminar on operations other than war. Other branches within the combat service support community focus more attention on the technical aspects of their trade but all are exposed to field training and operations other than war concepts and principles.

APPENDIX II

Army War College

The Army's senior leadership course exposes officers to stability operations concepts and principles throughout a ten month period of instruction. As part of its core curriculum, each student is also required to take a separate, one week class in operations other than war. The first two days are devoted to discussions of the concepts and principles contained in the Joint and Army publications and recently published articles—which are themselves reinforced with discussions resulting from a study of Operation Restore Hope and guest speaker presentations. The last three days are devoted to a contingency exercise based on a post-Fidel Castro scenario for Cuba. During this exercise, students will prepare the command assessment for the national leadership, prepare a warning order after receipt of strategic guidance from the president and secretary of defense, and conduct a comprehensive mission analysis and course of action briefing for the supported commander-in-chief.

The War College curriculum also incorporates a two week strategic crisis exercise late in the course. The exercise is set in the early 21st century and is based on a global scenario involving military conflicts occurring simultaneously in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Africa, and Southwest Asia. It also involves scenarios in the U.S. Pacific Command and Southern Command areas of responsibility that require a noncombatant evacuation mission in Hong Kong and military-diplomatic interventions over a Spratly Island land dispute in the Pacific and a border dispute between Bolivia, Peru, and Chile in South America. Within the U.S. Atlantic Command area, crisis planning is conducted for a series of natural disasters occurring within the United States. These planning exercises are used to test the student's ability to apply strategic and operational principles and concepts and require students to undertake a leadership role within numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as

positions on the various staffs of the supported commander-in-chief. These interactive exercises are aided by the joint integrated contingency, crisis action, and analysis gaming information system models to simulate probable outcomes of operational plans developed by the students. The variety and complexity of the exercise scenarios provide the basis for a practical application of conceptual principles taught in the core curriculum. It also gives the students an appreciation for the roles of the various players and the coordination, integration and synchronization required to be an effective leader at the national level.

The Army War College also has three elective courses offered to the students that are inherently important in peace operations: How to Negotiate: Strategy and Process, Collective Security and Peacekeeping, and Operational Issues in Peace Operations. The first course is designed to improve the student's negotiation skills through the study of a systematic process which is reinforced with a series of increasingly complex practical exercises and case studies. The Collective Security and Peacekeeping course not only covers basic concepts and principles but provides an analysis of peace operations trends and concepts that have evolved over time. Each student must present a 30 minute briefing on an assigned case study covering the situation, mission, and summary of the operation, including an analysis of the tactics and procedures employed, and reasons for mission success or failure. The final elective, Operational Issues in Peace Operations, focuses on the strategic, operational, and tactical relationships in peace operations and issues associated with multi-national collaborative efforts. Attention is devoted to the military, political, and humanitarian dimensions of peace operations with particular emphasis on command and control procedures, rules of engagement, and transitional planning considerations. The course is supplemented with guest speakers and panel discussions.